Essay writing

This is a characteristic of history: it is always rewritten and always with the best intention-to clarify, supplement and expand existing knowledge. However, the same thing sometimes happens with other sciences. So, at the call of his heart and his native party, Academician Trofim Lysenko created a new Marxist biology from scratch. This new science was studied in schools and universities, but then it was sorted out. However, this happens more often with history, because history is a story about people and their actions, and people, unlike cows and sheep, are much more concerned with their God-given image and the opinion of their own kind about it. That's why the story has to be constantly improved.

History was best improved in the Land of the Soviets, that is, very vigorously, and the scientific community even became convinced that " we have an unpredictable past."

After the great collapse of 1917, the opinion of the main Marxist historian M. N. Pokrovsky prevailed that the history of Russia is insignificant and disgusting and therefore it is not even worth studying; instead of history, they studied social studies. At the same time, in the development of the Pokrovsky doctrine, People's Commissar A.V. Lunacharsky stated in print:: "Teaching history in the direction of creating national pride, national feeling, etc. should be abandoned; teaching history, which is eager to find good role models in the examples of the past, should be abandoned" [cit. by: Solzhenitsyn, 1998, p. 134].

Among the party comrades, such a categorical judgment was understood: the World Revolution was about to take place, national borders would disappear, and the world proletariat (there would be no other classes) would live in a single happy community. Who, then, will need national stories? Especially as useless as Russian history?

The 20s of the XX century in Russia were marked by a merciless (as yet without bloodshed) war between internationalists and Autochthons. The internationalists, well - educated and sometimes brilliant, claimed to be the leaders in the country and in the process of its revolutionary transformation. Autochthons-half-educated, bad speakers-did not want to give in to the newcomers: "... while we were rotting in hard labor and overthrowing the tsar, you were cooling off in Europe." The internationalists have lost their leader, Leon Trotsky, and the Autochthons have found their leader.

The Autochthons won, and international Bolshevism was replaced by national Bolshevism. Autochthonous people need their own history, so that everyone knows that this is their land, so that their neighbors do not claim it and remember how they were rebuffed in the past when they attempted to do good to their neighbors. In addition, the World Revolution was delayed, and the Nazis, with their aggressive foreign policy doctrine, took root in Germany.

History (as a science) returned to the Soviet Union in the mid-1930s, but certainly not in the same form as before 1917. The attitude towards the tsars remained Leninist and harsh-

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The tsar's servants also did not deserve a kind word, although there were exceptions, such as A. V. Suvorov, and a completely new thing appeared that was not present in pre - revolutionary historiography: it became necessary to assess the colonial policy of Russia.

Old-school Russian historians have barely spoken out on this topic. It was believed that the Russians on their bayonets brought, say, to Central Asia liberation from the Khan's arbitrariness, that is, law, order and pacification, as well as the revival of economic activity. The Russian Orientalist N. I. Veselovsky was obviously one of the few, if not the only one, who saw the reverse side of the coin: "We think that we gave the Asians we conquered peace, tranquility, and security... But there is also a higher good, above all this. This is a nationality, a national feeling... It is necessary to enter into the position of the conquered Muslims " [cit. by: Lunin, 1969, p. 145].

V. I. Lenin "got into the position of Muslims" and declared Russia a "prison of the peoples". This idea was developed by Pokrovsky and his students: they wrote much and persistently about the "atrocities of tsarism", about the "savage exploitation of the local population", etc. In the Soviet literature of those years, it was concluded that the inclusion of Central Asian ethnic groups in the Russian Empire was "absolutely evil." That is why, when in the 1920s in Moscow it was decided to give the peoples of the East a new graphic instead of Arabic, they decided on the Latin alphabet, although Russian remained the language of interethnic communication. The train of thought was that if the Cyrillic alphabet was imposed, Russification would continue. The internationalists were afraid of this accusation, and they did not like Russia either.

With the victory of the autochthons, the foundations of the state-patriotic policy began to form, and new attitudes appeared. Russia's conquest of the Central Asian region was now being declared the "lesser evil," since it would have been even worse if England had invaded.

Finally, at the very beginning of the 1950s, a new formulation was invented: the annexation of other lands to Russia was a progressive phenomenon, since it combined the liberation impulse of the peoples oppressed by tsarism with the organized revolutionary movement of the Russian proletariat. This ideologeme lasted until the end of the 80s of the XX century.

Meanwhile, during the 70-75 Soviet years, a national cadre of historians grew up in the republics of the Soviet Union, who studied the history of their peoples, but at the same time wrote their works in Russian and adjusted their scientific conclusions to the schemes dictated from the center, which, among other things, changed. It is not difficult to imagine how much all this hurt their national dignity, the very "national feeling" that the Russian scientist N. I. Veselovsky wrote about.

The "perestroika" announced in 1985 ended with the collapse of the" building "that bore the name" Soviet Union", and then it was time to create"your own stories" on the ruins. It cannot be said that this was a completely new matter for the national historian - he tried to break through with his ethnocentrism from under the press of the official, in the Center of the historiosophical doctrine created earlier, but often, while the Soviet government had strength, he was punished for this, but now "operational space" opened up, because the imperial Center disappeared.

And although the Soviet constitution of 1977 called the union republics "sovereign states," they were quasi-states, and therefore now it was necessary to prove that initially, before being enslaved by Russian colonialism, they were full-fledged subjects of world history, cultural and very progressive countries. Once again, national historians received a social order, this time from the new ruling elites, who are concerned with legitimizing "their" anthem and coat of arms,

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history, power. Historians behaved normally and appropriately. "The servility of historians, "write the authors of the collection National Histories in the Soviet and Post - Soviet States," does not require special comments. Historiography is perceived by most of them, formed in the Soviet era, as an ideological tool, the tuning fork of which is the installation of "from above". It is naive to appeal to the part of specialists who are in the circle of the new mythology about the need to observe scientific and value proportions in historical delights: this is their historical chance, this is their "business"" [National History ..., 1999, p. 64].

This is undoubtedly true: first, if a historian from a non-free country does not emigrate, he either stops working or works "as it should". It doesn't make sense to shame or appeal to his conscience, but there is a smart reader who makes sense to appeal to, who is able to form his own opinion. And secondly, since the self-assertion of the elites of the new post-Soviet countries follows a single pattern - through accusations against Russia and the USSR, which allegedly slowed down the natural development of these countries and prevented their prosperity, it is the duty of Russian historians not to remain silent, counting on the same intelligent reader.

There are other considerations. The rethinking of the history of the peoples of the USSR, which began in 1988-1991, created a guilt complex in Russian society for its imperial past, which the brusque leaders of" fraternal " countries constantly reproach Russians with, blackmailing the Russian government. "In 1990, when relations between the center and the republics began to deteriorate rapidly," the collection quoted above says, " the historical image of Russia was just as rapidly acquiring absolutely negative features. It appears as an aggressor country, a strangler of national independence, not only from the time of Stalin, but also from pre-Soviet times " [National History..., 1999, p. 77]. Almost 15 years have passed since the collapse of the USSR, but the image of Russia is persistently demonized in national historiographies in the post-Soviet space to this day, national historians have again armed themselves with the thesis of M. N. Pokrovsky, as if the annexation of their lands to the Russian Empire was "absolute evil". The authors of works published in Ashgabat, Kiev, Tbilisi, Tashkent and other capitals of the "friendly" CIS states convince their readers of this, which is understandable, since there is an order from above, but it is not clear why this dubious idea attracts Moscow publishers at the beginning of the XXI century.

Three years ago, the Moscow publishing house Vagrius published a book by Levitin, who now lives in Germany. The author of the book" Uzbekistan at a historical turn " writes: "Over time, it can be argued that the geocultural colonial expansion of Great Britain, of course, was significantly different from the Russian one. British influence was manifested primarily at the level of achievements of material culture. In Russia's Central Asian possessions, this model could hardly be effective, both because of Russia's technical and economic backwardness and because of a fundamentally different mechanism of interstate relations "[Levitin, 2001, p. 87].

The simple idea is expressed very scientifically, and therefore vaguely, but the essence is clear: Britain brought the achievements of science and technology to its colonies, and Russia did not. The judgment is not true. First, Russia's conquest of Central Asia took place between 1865 and 1882. By that time, England had owned India, for example, for 100 years, that is, it had time to build railways and telegraph lines there. The Russians, by the way, began to build a telegraph in Central Asia in the early 70s of the XIX century, and a railway - in 1880. Secondly, England did not introduce any particularly advanced technologies in India. Both the Russians and the British developed colonial economies primarily for their own needs, and therefore

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for all the technical and economic advancement of Great Britain, Indians were permanently starving - famine usually claimed millions of lives.

The author of the book" Uzbekistan at a Historical Turning point " was struck and horrified by the modernization carried out in Central Asia during the Soviet era. "Modernization in Uzbekistan has quickly introduced the country to technological progress and machine labor... Modernization in Uzbekistan meant a clash of civilizations, their elements, when iron went against the earth, when people of one culture imposed their will on people of another culture. It was Moloch - a terrible, insatiable force that requires human sacrifice "[Levitin, 1999, p. 130].

Everything is right: This was the case, but not only in Uzbekistan. The author apparently does not know that modernization and archaism are incompatible, that modernization is aimed at destroying archaic civilizations and traditional societies, and that archaic societies resist modernization. This was the case in England in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, when capitalism was rising and humanists like Thomas More were angrily denouncing the process. If Uzbekistan had successfully resisted Russian and Soviet modernization, it would be like Afghanistan today.

In a strange way, Levitin's light-weight work aroused warm feelings not only among publishers, but also in the soul of the author of the preface, a full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, A. N. Yakovlev: "The book impresses with its cognitive richness, the subtleties of historical interweaving, and the formulation of problems that have no solutions" [Levitin, 1999, p.5]. The book is "striking", but not with what the academician reports.

The collective monograph "National Histories in the Soviet and post-Soviet states" contains essays on the "new" histories of almost all new states, except, perhaps, Uzbekistan, which is why below we will discuss the creation of a new Uzbek history. In the vast expanses of post-Soviet Asia, time does not pass as quickly as, say, in the Baltic Region , where they have not completely abandoned the Soviet tradition of quoting the main leader, now the president of the country, at the beginning of any scientific work. For example: President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, in his speech at a meeting with historians of the country (June 1998), emphasized that"...self-consciousness begins with the knowledge of history", "without historical memory there is no future", "history is the basis of the spirituality of the people" [quoted in: Ismailova, 2002, p. 3].

After the leader's purposeful speech, the executive body, the Cabinet of Ministers (as the CPSU Central Committee once did), passes a resolution "On improving the activities of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan", in which it criticizes the scientific institution for not paying attention to the urgent needs of the people and sets tasks in the light... and the like, following a familiar pattern. Scientists are told that their task "is to study the true history of the Uzbek people" (not Uzbek, but Uzbek). Scientists are required to abandon the "one-sided approach, falsification of the past, propaganda of colonial ideology in the study of the history of the Uzbek people and its statehood" [Narodnoe slovo, 1998, p. 1].

By reading historical works published in Tashkent in recent years, one can "calculate" the attitudes obtained by scientific personnel from above. So, now we should assume that the period of colonialism for Uzbekistan lasted not 50, but 130 years. "In the beginning," says one abstract of a PhD thesis, "it was the era of the colonial rule of the Russian Empire, then the decades of the Soviet Empire" [Kotyukova, 2001, p. 3].

Judging by the works I have read, Russia faces numerous charges. This list is impressive, and the charges are very serious. All these accusations are repeated in the post-Soviet writings of historians of Uzbekistan, and even among those who developed as a scientist back in the Soviet years.

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In 1990 (the heyday of the perestroika "glasnost", that is, freedom of speech), Uzbek historian Fayzula Buribayevich Iskhakov published in Tashkent the book "The Past through the eyes of a historian", in the annotation to which it is said: "The author raises a number of pre-war problems in a new way, which are now... they again became the subject of heated debates and discussions " [Iskhakov, 1990, p. 2]. And this newly written work says: "...the progressive consequences of the annexation of Central Asia to Russia were the abolition of slavery and the return of 30 thousand slaves to their homeland, the development of productive forces, the strengthening of qualitatively new trends in the economic life of the region, the spread of secular ideology and the weakening of the rule of feudal-clerical ideology, although social oppression increased which became double" [Iskhakov, 1990, p. 11]. Further, the author details his idea: "But capitalism, especially colonial capitalism, is full of contradictions. And one of them was that in a little more than half a century Turkestan's productive forces reached a level that would have taken much longer under previous conditions. Thus, the construction of railways, the strengthening of the commodity character of agricultural production, primarily cotton growing, the creation of machine production for the primary processing of raw materials, the replacement of primitive medieval tools, especially in agriculture, with more advanced ones, the development (even for colonialist purposes) of forms of production organization and secular education-all this significantly changed the way of life of the population Turkestan" [Iskhakov, 1990, p. 17].

In these words, Fayzula Buribayevich describes the modernization of Turkestan, which was the result of the region's entry into the Russian Empire, and he considers it a progressive phenomenon. But then, by itself, without any effort on the part of the people or the elite of this union republic, and even against their wishes, state independence came. And in 1997, F. B. Iskhakov published the book " The National Policy of Tsarism in Turkestan (1867-1917)", in which he again" in a new way "approached the old problems:" ...for more than 50 years of the colonial rule of tsarism in Central Asia, especially in the Turkestan region, changes in the structure of the population that are useful for the population there was no political power, no military-police bodies..."[Iskhakov, 1997, p. 39]. But what about the "weakening of the feudal-clerical ideology", more simply, the restriction of feudal arbitrariness?

In his first book, the author unequivocally approves of the abolition of slavery by the Russians, and in the second hints that this slavery was not so bad: "... unlike "classical" slavery in Ancient Greece, the Roman Empire... Slavery in Transoxiana (Central Asia ), and later in the khanates of the region, had a slightly different character. Here, slaves had the right to start a family, as well as the right to buy their freedom" [Iskhakov, 1997, p.55]. So the Russians tried in vain. By the way, in Greece and Rome, slaves enjoyed the same rights [Sergeenko, 2000, pp. 246-247].

The book, written in a new way, "the progressive consequences of the annexation of Central Asia to Russia" is called into question: "The Russian leaders considered it necessary to deform the historically formed economic, social and spiritual community of the population of local nationalities" [Iskhakov, 1997, p.90]. The author, therefore, sees malicious intent in the modernizing activity of Russians ("considered necessary").

A fairly large part of the 1997 edition of the book is devoted to the topic of Russian migration, which the author describes as a continuous disaster for the local population: "With its own population of about 4.5 million people, Turkestan was forced to accept dozens, and in some years hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Russia every year... The massive influx of mostly poor migrants meant not only an increase in the scale of confiscation and seizure of his land, but also the land use of the population.-

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tax, subsistence taxes and other mandatory payments, but also the deterioration of the situation in all spheres of life " [Iskhakov, 1997, p. 90].

According to Iskhakov's data (4.5 million people), Turkestan was sparsely populated at the beginning of the 20th century . Today, more than 25 million people live in Uzbekistan alone (part of the former Turkestan), and there they do not complain of overpopulation; the republic is able to feed itself.

In fact, there were not many Russian settlers, and they settled either in newly built cities or along the railway. In 1910, one of the Russian officials of the Resettlement Administration wrote:: "The Russian population here is a handful, in the Samarkand region Russians make up 1.6%, in the Ferghana region - 0.6%, and the Russian rural population in the Samarkand region is about 5,000 souls of both sexes (natives - 220,000), in the Ferghana region - 8788 (natives-1,950,000) [Perestroika..., 1911, p. 330 - 331]. With all their zeal, this handful of Russian people could not damage the local dehkanstvo. And F. himself. In 1990, Iskhakov was calm about the problem of resettlement: "These families (of the displaced people ) settled on uncultivated lands, mainly rainfed, and laid the foundation for cultural rainfed agriculture in previously livestock-breeding areas. Migrants often bought both irrigated land and pasture lands from the indigenous population, but this was not of a mass nature " [Iskhakov, 1990, p. 26]. This is the" early " Iskhakov, when he looked at the problem in a new way, but not quite in a new way.

By the way, at the same time, another well-known Uzbek scientist, G. I. Khidoyatov, also saw this problem: "But the biggest obstacle to resettlement was the mass settlement of nomads, which began after the establishment of Russian rule. There was no free irrigated land, and almost the entire Turkestan region was closed to migrants" [Khidoyatov, 1990, p. 288]. Nomads were the main competitors of the local sedentary population.

During the Soviet era, historians had a long debate about the motives of Russian expansion in Central Asia. Some put forward a military-strategic reason in the first place, that is, colonial rivalry with Great Britain, while others gave priority to economic necessity - the search for sales markets for the goods of the young Russian industry. In addition to the two reasons mentioned, there was a third reason that the Soviets were not supposed to talk about: Russia bordered on the east with a "Wild Field", with the territory of nomadic ethnic groups, whose custom was to rob trade caravans, ruin agricultural settlements and take their inhabitants into slavery. In the slave markets of Khiva and Bukhara, Russian slaves were sold by the thousands. No European Power has ever had such a neighborhood. Thus, we can talk about a complex of reasons for Russian expansion in Asia.

Uzbek scientists, however, now have the installation " abandon... falsification of the past and propaganda of colonial ideology", and therefore the same Iskhakov explains Russian expansion with a single motive: "the emergence of great-power aspirations of the Russian state and chauvinistic views in the minds of the ruling circles, as well as a significant part of the emerging part of the Russian intelligentsia" [Iskhakov, 1997, p.33].

But this does not happen: "aspirations" and "views" do not arise from scratch, a base is needed, and such a base was precisely the needs of the economy and strengthening border security. Similarly, today the messianic aspirations of the U.S. government and people are based on economic strength and the steady development of a 200-year-old democratic tradition.

Further, the cited author writes: "Tsarism in economic terms pursued the goal of extracting material benefits from the acquired territories as quickly as possible and without any costs on its part" [Iskhakov, 1997, p.33]. You can write this,

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if you are absolutely sure that your readers are virginally ignorant and have not read anything other than your book and will not continue to read it, because this statement does not correspond to the truth. The author's detailed passage is briefly described in one word-robbery, but the colonialists of the XIX century, whether British or Russian, could not afford to rob the colonies, as it was irrational and unprofitable. Colonies were acquired to generate stable incomes, and for this they had to invest capital. So, in Central Asia, Russians were attracted to cotton, but it was of poor quality, and therefore they had to spend a lot of money on breeding work and bring out a new variety of cotton within a few years, the fiber of which would be acceptable for the Russian textile industry. And one more argument: during the first 15 years of Russian administration of the Turkestan region, so much money was invested in its development that the budget deficit of the Turkestan general government amounted to about 100 million rubles-a huge amount at that time [Girs, p.366].

Fayzula Iskhakov accuses the Russian authorities of Turkestan of trying to Christianize the population of the region [Iskhakov, 1997, p. 36]. But it was just the opposite - the Russian authorities did not allow Orthodox missionaries to enter Central Asia, so that they would not compete with Islam and not cause hostility in the Muslim environment. The first Governor-General of Turkestan, K. P. Kaufman, resisted the establishment of an Orthodox diocese in Turkestan for all 15 years of his administration of the region. Until 1917, the Muslim clergy of Turkestan maintained an autonomous position, and numerous attempts by the Ufa Muftiate to establish control over it ended in failure.

In a striking way, Iskhakov condemns the land reform carried out by the Russian authorities in the early 70s of the XIX century, as a result of which the Central Asian Dehkans received land [Iskhakov, 1997, p.64]. If you really want to whine, then that's it. As you know, for a long time after the October Revolution of 1917, almost everything that was done under the "old regime" was viewed negatively, and yet here is what was said about the land reform in Turkestan in the ideologically very correct magazine "Historian-Marxist" in 1928: "Lands of the aristocracy on the one hand, they began to be taxed...; on the other hand, the lands of the Uzbek aristocrats began to be fixed in the ownership of the tenants who sat on them... Here the rights to land were recognized for the peasants, and the recalcitrant land aristocracy was depopulated" (Khodorov, 1928, p. 141). What was wrong with the Russian land reform?

Historical works published recently in Tashkent constantly accuse the Russian authorities of discriminating against the local population when applying for a job, while mentioning such sectors of the economy where a good knowledge of the Russian language (for example, the telegraph) and special training were necessary [Iskhakov, 1997, p.36]. It is quite natural that the first job to be taken on the telegraph and railway was taken by Russians. So today, workers from Tajikistan in Moscow are hired not to work at the computer, but to dig ditches.

Historians of modern Uzbekistan accuse the Russians of "blocking the natural evolution of Central Asian statehood" [Abdurakhimova and Rustamova, 1999, p.4]. But these accusations are groundless. First, the Russians preserved intact the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, which for 50 years (1867-1917) had all the opportunities to "naturally evolve", and, secondly, offered the parts of Central Asia that were included in the Turkestan General Government Russian state institutions. Thus, the native Turkestanis gained freedom of choice, which became even greater after 1905.

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Scientists in independent Uzbekistan make similar accusations against Russia, but they or their colleagues refute these accusations. "From the first steps of colonization of Turkestan," Zh.K. Ismailova writes in her dissertation, "the tsarist government began to encroach on the political, economic and social positions of Islam" [Ismailova, 2002, p. 27]. However, another Tashkent historian who is already known to us is F. Iskhakov, documentarily refutes his colleague on the shop floor: "During all the years of Russia's colonial rule, there were always many parents in the region who were ready to donate funds for the maintenance of the maktab (lower Qur'anic school ) and mullah teachers" (Iskhakov, 1997, p.177). And further: "...in 1865-1917, the number of madrassas (higher Quranic school) in the Turkestan region did not decrease, but increased" [Iskhakov, 1997, p. 179].

As negative factors of Russian governance Zh. Ismailova calls: "the destruction of national statehood by the tsarist autocracy, disregard for the vital interests of the indigenous population, deprivation of their political rights and freedoms ..." [Ismailova, 2002, p. 28]. But other authors who write on the same topic refute it and accuse Russia, for example, of "preserving obsolete state institutions" [Abdurakhimova and Rustamova, 1999, p.73]. Ismailova denounces Russia for depriving the indigenous population of political rights and freedoms (as if it had such rights in the Khan's times!), and another colleague, T. V. Kotyukova, almost simultaneously writes the work "Problems of Turkestan in the central legislative authorities of the Russian Empire (1905-1917)", in which she talks about the activities of the Muslim community. factions in the State Duma [Kotyukova, 2001, p. 12-22], which is in poor agreement with Ismailova's statement.

And one more discrepancy. Scientists have been instructed to regard the independence of Uzbekistan as "the result of a persistent national liberation struggle "[Kotyukova, 2001, p. 3], and they readily repeat this thesis, while Iskhakov says that the local population "did not have weapons, political parties, or leaders capable of rousing the masses to an anti-colonial struggle" [Iskhakov, 1997, p. 120]. What about without all this?

Over the years of independence of sovereign Uzbekistan, more than a dozen scientific papers with pronounced anti-Russian content have been written, and almost every one more or less clearly contains the same nostalgic motif: life was better and more fun under the Khans, and even slavery was quite acceptable. "Instead of statehood based on national interests and values," writes G. K. Rustamova, "a new political and economic model was forcibly imposed" [Rustamova, 1999, p. 13]. Strictly speaking, these and similar statements, in which the past is clearly idealized, are surprising today, in the twenty-first century. Can the slavish belittlement of the people and the khan's arbitrariness really be considered "national values"? It is unlikely that the authors are not aware of this, but there is an attitude.

By the way, the nostalgic approach to the pre-colonial past is typical not only for scientists in Uzbekistan. For several decades after independence, scholars and writers in Africa have been praising their pre-colonial past, cursing colonial modernization, and calling on nations to return to a time when "all men were brothers." Africans can understand: the European colonialists did not complete their "dual mission" (Karl Marx), they did not complete modernization, and today it is incredibly difficult to keep up with the rapidly changing world. But Uzbekistan is not Africa. Uzbekistan came to independence with research institutions and aircraft manufacturing, and the foundation of modern society was laid in the first 50 years of Russia's presence in Turkestan.

One can understand, of course, that the young independent state does not yet have the experience of a decent independent existence, that independence came unexpectedly-

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but when few people thought about it, when union ties were abruptly severed, which caused huge difficulties and annoyance, but why does the local elite think that it will correct the situation by resorting to" ignorant groaning of Russia " (the expression of D. S. Likhachev)? Russia is a neighbor, and a neighbor can always come in handy. In addition, the Russian diaspora in Central Asia is still numerous and necessary for new independent countries, as it consists of valuable specialists. It is unwise and unproductive to turn indigenous people against them. Why do we need ethnic strife?

Africans tend to blame the European colonialists for all their troubles, but the Indians have long abandoned this unsympathetic method. India remembers with gratitude what was done there by the British, and even offers to restore monuments to British viceroys who were thrown from their pedestals shortly after 1947. History has taken another turn.

list of literature

Abdurakhimova N. A., Rustamova G. The colonial system of power in Turkestan in the second half of the XIX - first quarter of the XX century. Tashkent, 1999.

Garilov R. Historiographical tendencies of studying social processes of the early XX century in Uzbekistan / / Public opinion, human rights. Tashkent, No. 2, 2001.

Girs F. K. Report of the auditor on the Highest order of the Turkestan region T. S. Girs (B. M., B. G.).

Ismailova Zh. K. National liberation movement in Turkestan at the beginning of the XX century. diss. doctor of Historical sciences. Tashkent, 2002.

Iskhakov F. The past through the eyes of a historian. Tashkent, 1990.

Iskhakov F. The national policy of Tsarism in Turkestan (1867-1917). Tashkent, 1997.

Kotyukova T. V. Problems of Turkestan in the central legislative authorities of the Russian Empire (1905-1917). Author's abstract. diss. of Candidate of Historical sciences. Tashkent, 2001.

Levitin L. Uzbekistan at a historical turn. Critical notes of a supporter of President Islam Karimov, Moscow, 2001.

Lunin B. V. Central Asia in the scientific heritage of Russian Oriental studies. Tashkent, 1969.

A popular word. 28 07.1998.

National Stories in the Soviet and post-Soviet States, Moscow, 1999.

Migration affairs in the Turkestan region. Report on a business trip to Turkestan in the autumn of 1910 by N. Gavrilov, an official of special assignments at the Resettlement Department. St. Petersburg, 1911.

Rustamova G. K. Colonial essence of Tsarist and Bolshevik power in Turkestan (1867-1924). Author's abstract. diss. of Candidate of Historical sciences. Tashkent, 1999.

Sergeenko M. E. Zhizn ' v drevnem Rime [Life in ancient Rome]. St. Petersburg, 2000. Solzhenitsyn A. I. Russia in the collapse. Moscow, 1998. Khidoyatov G. A. My native history. Tashkent, 1990.

I. Khodorov. On the historical evolution of land ownership in Turkestan. / / Istorik-Marxist, 1928, No. 10.

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