With the rise of the PRC and the strengthening of its power, more and more attention is drawn to the emerging significant change in the balance of forces on the world stage and the associated strengthening of its geopolitical rivalry with the United States. The question of the current and future relationship between the traditional pole of power and the challenging geopolitical "upstart" is being asked by many American experts - both government and private*.

The opinion of Henry Kissinger, one of the patriarchs of American diplomacy and the architects of the US - China rapprochement in the early 1970s, who to this day remains in the camp of Washington's "pigeons" who advocate a pragmatic, generally calm and relatively positive approach to the PRC, has considerable weight. Many of Kissinger's thoughts on this topic are included in his book On China, a solid work with rich material on the development of US - China relations after the formation of the PRC, including declassified conversations with Chinese leaders and personal impressions of the former US national security adviser as a direct participant in them. At the same time, he does not hide his sympathies for Maoist China and antipathy to the Soviet Union. Kissinger clearly has a hint of nostalgia for the days of the semi-public anti-Soviet alliance between Washington and Beijing, which ultimately turned into a headache for many American strategists.

The book was translated into Russian by Astrel Publishing house in December ^2012.1 It is described in an article by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation, Senior Researcher of the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. I. Trifonov.

US-China relations Keywords:, Henry Kissinger, the book "About China"

V. I. TRIFONOV

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Henry Kissinger's work on China is built in a geopolitical context, from the point of view of the eternal and persistent struggle of the United States to ensure its leadership in the world, Washington's line of weakening and pushing back its main geopolitical opponents: the Soviet Union-before its collapse, and then the PRC, which significantly strengthened its international positions over the past decades and, according to Washington, D.C., which has challenged American dominance with its policies.

Much attention is paid to the motives of Beijing's behavior in international relations, certain aspects of the internal situation in the PRC, and the circumstances that led to such a rapid transformation of the PRC into an "economic superpower". The Taiwan issue is a constant background, and the vicissitudes of the struggle between the parties around Taiwan at all stages of the development of relations between Washington and Beijing are described.

AT THE ORIGINS OF CONVERGENCE

In a fairly detailed historical digression, Kissinger emphasizes that without the past, it is difficult "to understand China's diplomacy in the twentieth century or its role in the twenty-first century." ²

In his opinion, being for many centuries in captivity of their ideas about their own exclusivity and superiority in the world, the Chinese rulers overlooked the breakthrough of Western countries that went far ahead in their industrial and military development and easily managed to conquer China. At the same time, Kissinger highlights Japan, which managed to rebuild itself in time (the Meiji Revolution of 1867-1868) and, unlike the Western European powers, which did not set out to overthrow the Qing Empire, " sought not only to occupy a significant Chinese territory, but also to

* For more information, see: Yurlov F. N. China, India and the USA: the correlation of forces is changing / / Asia and Africa Today, 2013, N 1,2 (editor's note).

replacing China as the center of the new world order in East Asia" (which, in fact, was fully confirmed in the subsequent aggressive actions of militaristic Japan against China).

According to Kissinger, on the eve and after the formation of the PRC in 1949, Washington did not immediately decide on the new Chinese state. Some influential political figures, including Secretary of State David Acheson, called for a new course towards China based on the current realities.³ This is evidenced, in particular, by the White Paper of the US State Department on the collapse of the Kuomintang and Acheson's speech at the National Press Club on January 12, 1950. The Secretary of State referred to the actions of "Russian imperialism", which allegedly seized one Chinese territory after another (Kissinger highlights such a detail that such statements by the American side could have pushed I. V. Putin). Stalin's approach to changing attitudes towards Mao Zedong, who was in late 1949 and early 1950. on a visit to Moscow and subjected to obvious bullying by the Soviet leader, as well as to the accelerated conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of February 14, 1950).

The Korean War intervened, however, and delayed U.S.-Chinese normalization for many years. At the same time, Kissinger believes that the provocative role in unleashing the war in Korea was played by the USSR, which dragged the PRC into military operations (under the pretext that the United States, they say, would not get involved in this war)*. However, Kissinger points out, the Soviet Union ultimately lost, and China, despite its heavy losses, has strengthened its standing in the world as a country that was not afraid to challenge the United States and managed to withstand a confrontation with the most powerful world power.

When describing the subsequent course of events, Kissinger does not hide his sympathies for the PRC and the then Chinese leaders (the" gigantic"," towering over all " figure of Mao Zedong, the diplomatic skill and charisma of Zhou Enlai), while the Soviet Union is presented as an aggressive, expansionist power, and the Soviet leaders as tough, insidious figures. He constantly notes such a characteristic detail that, no matter how the US-Chinese relations developed, the Chinese leaders invariably defended the line of independence, independence of the PRC, equality in relations with other states, and indicated that they would never give in to pressure.

The former US Secretary of State considers the beginning of the movement of the US and China towards each other in the late 60s to be expected and necessary: it would have happened under any leadership of the parties. The main role here was played by simple logic: these countries had to unite against "a common enemy at that time" (according to Kissinger, the Chinese were seriously afraid of a massive strike from the Soviet Union, which concentrated its million-strong army on the border with China). At the same time, it follows from Kissinger's words that the initiative for rapprochement was shown by Beijing, and US President R. Nixon did not miss the "strategic opportunity"that arose. A group of "elders", consisting of Marshals Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen, who worked from May to October 1969 to work out the future course of the PRC in the current difficult international conditions, clearly recommended starting a dialogue with the United States4. And the so-called ping-pong diplomacy, according to Kissinger, was a Chinese move. During an international ping-pong tournament in Japan, the American team was unexpectedly invited to China, where immediately upon arrival it was received at the NPC building by Zhou Enlai, who said that they "opened a new chapter in relations between the American and Chinese peoples. I am sure that the beginning of our friendship will certainly receive the support of the majority of our peoples."⁵. And in October 1971, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua headed a Chinese delegation to New York to attend the XXVI session of the UN General Assembly, which decided to restore the legitimate rights of the PRC in the UN.

ON AN ANTI-SOVIET PLATFORM

As can be seen from Kissinger's recordings of conversations with the Chinese leadership during his trips to China in the late 60s and early 70s, as well as during R. Nixon's visit to China (February 21-28, 1972), which ended with the signing of the Shanghai Communique, the parties ' conversations mainly revolved around the Soviet-Chinese confrontation, divination, whether the Soviet Union will attack China or not. Moreover, even here, in Kissinger's eyes, the main culprit of the tension created in Soviet-Chinese relations and the general deterioration of relations was the Soviet side (of course, the issues of democracy and the need to respect human rights were not raised by the Americans at that time).

However, diplomatic relations between the United States and China were not established. Va-

* The documents do not support this primitive anti-Soviet interpretation of the ambiguous position of Stalin, who hesitated for a long time before giving North Korean leader Kim Il Sung permission to "liberate" the South. Beijing also supported Pyongyang's "initiative" based on its own considerations. At the same time, when the North Korean forces were on the verge of complete defeat, Moscow was pushing Beijing to "help out" them. But the PRC had no other choice. For more information, see: Tprkunov A.V. The Mysterious War: the Korean conflict of 1950 - 1953. Moscow, Rosspen, 2000, pp. 30-120; Urnov A. Yu. Voina v Korey [The War in Korea].

Shington wasn't ready for that yet. Taiwan-related issues needed to be settled; resistance to further concessions to China in the US Congress was too strong.

The acceleration of the full normalization of US-Chinese relations and the establishment of diplomatic relations between them (since January 1, 1979) was the alleged "unprecedented escalation" of the Soviet Union's actions to establish its dominance in various parts of the world - in Africa, Latin America, Indochina, and the Middle East. In fact, everything happened exactly the opposite: the USSR, as a whole, was losing its position. Washington decided that it was impossible to delay any further. In May 1978, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Z. S., visited Beijing on a special mission. Brzezinski, in conversations with whom Deng Xiaoping actively developed the topic of Soviet expansionism, criticized the US policy of "appeasement" of the USSR. During the subsequent secret negotiations, the necessary conditions for establishing diplomatic relations were worked out. Washington had to sacrifice official ties with Taipei, although it managed to keep Taiwan under its protection, including the supply of American weapons.

According to Kissinger, Beijing was forced to accept this, seriously needing American support due to the continuing pressure on it from the USSR. Judging by the former US Secretary of State's account of events, Deng Xiaoping's main concern during his visit to the US (January 28-February 5, 1979) was whether the Soviet Union would intervene if the PRC took military action against Vietnam, and how the US would behave in this situation. "We do not recommend creating a formal alliance," Deng Xiaoping said, " but each side should act on the basis of our position, coordinate our steps and take the necessary measures."⁶. As Kissinger points out, China launched a large-scale invasion of Vietnam on February 17, 1979, almost immediately after the visit. Although Beijing has had a hard time, Kissinger believes that here, too, China emerged victorious in a duel with Moscow, teaching a lesson to its closest Soviet ally and, in fact, allegedly stopping further Soviet advances in Indochina. Kissinger sees the Soviet Union's passivity during the Third Vietnam War as "the first symptom of the Soviet Union's decline." ⁷

Kissinger writes that the 1980s, the years of Reagan's presidency, were marked by a calm course of US-China relations. China began to gradually move towards normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. The process accelerated when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR with his "glasnost" and "perestroika"policies. In turn, Western countries continued their policy of strengthening ties with China and providing it with assistance in economic development.

A sharp dissonance in this situation was the events in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. The United States was forced, Kissinger writes, to join the general chorus of criticism of Beijing from Western countries, although Washington's reaction was still more restrained. President George H. W. Bush, who came to power shortly before these events, although he adopted a number of sanctions against China, sent a personal letter to Deng Xiaoping on June 21, calling the latter his "friend" and trying to explain in a soft way why the United States should have done so. "We must not allow the consequences of recent tragic events to undermine the vital relationship that has been patiently built over the past 17 years,"he said.⁸. Following this, the President's national Security Adviser, B. Scowcroft, and the Deputy Chairman of the National Security Council, went to Beijing on a secret mission. Secretary of State L. Eagleberger, whose task was to repair the complicated relations.

"SHOCK" FOR BEIJING

The real shock for the Chinese, Kissinger notes, was the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, during his conversation with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in September 1990, Chinese leaders pointed out that the situation in China is fundamentally different from what it was in the Soviet Union: "Attempts to find China's Gorbachev," Jiang Zemin said, " are futile."⁹. From the words of the Chinese leaders, it followed that China is also for a peaceful existence, but the meaning of the Chinese line is not to appease the West, as Gorbachev did. The Chinese have made it clear that they will pursue their own policy in accordance with Chinese national interests. In general, Gorbachev was perceived in China as an "incongruous" political figure. His "modernization" program was also rejected, since political reforms in it preceded economic reforms.

As Kissinger noted, Chinese leaders also expressed strong opposition to the idea that ending the Cold War means entering the "American age." In a conversation with him in 1991, Jiang Zemin said that the world could not remain unipolar for long and that China would work to build a multipolar world.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, which became the successor of the USSR, has practically disappeared from Kissinger's field of vision (in the book under consideration), apparently ceasing to be a worthy rival of the United States. In the first place as a possible new main rival of the United States in world affairs came out

China. Accordingly, Washington's ways of interacting with Beijing and its attempts to influence China changed.

These new approaches were fully manifested when the democratic administration led by President Clinton came to power in the United States, which apparently decided that it was time to speak harshly with China as well. In September 1992, during the presidential campaign in the United States-B. Clinton sharply criticized the previous administration for continuing to "coddle" China after the Tiananmen Square events. According to Clinton, " China will not always be able to resist the forces that advocate democratic change. One day, it will follow the same path as the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The United States should do everything possible to encourage this process. " ¹⁰ Kissinger himself seems to have been offended by the new administration's rare brusqueness in bringing down a "big baton" labeled "democracy" and "human rights"on Beijing.

Another tool of pressure on the PRC was the issue of granting China the most-favored-nation trade regime. At the same time, according to Clinton, the "essence" of American policy towards China will be to "resolutely make significant progress in the field of human rights in China."¹² According to the American custom, it was emphasized that all this, they say, is being done for the benefit of China itself. However, in China, Kissinger notes, they did not think so, perceiving the American pressure as a desire to undermine the existing regime in China and as a direct challenge to China. According to Kissinger, there were "rough encounters" with Chinese leaders when emissaries from Washington visited the PRC, as was the case when Secretary of State Wu met in March 1994. It can be assumed that this line of the Clinton administration was one of the reasons for the rapid rapprochement between China and the new Russia that began at that time, which was consolidated in the Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration of determination "to develop relations of equal and trusting partnership aimed at strategic cooperation in the XXI century." Signed on April 25, 1996, during the visit of Russian President Boris Yeltsin to China).

During the Clinton administration, the third Taiwan crisis took place, caused by the permission of the United States for a private trip to the United States in 1995 by the "president" of Taiwan, Li Denghui (formally to attend a meeting of graduates of Cornell University, where Li Denghui defended his doctoral thesis in 1958). The crisis reached its peak in March 1996, before the next presidential campaign in Taiwan. Gradually, however, the American side, having achieved nothing, was forced to back down, and relations between the parties returned to normal. Jiang Zemin also exchanged visits to the United States (1997) and Clinton to China (1998).

According to Kissinger, U.S.-China relations have become even more stable under President George W. Bush, while the United States and Western countries have played an important role in China's economic recovery. Chinese leaders, on the other hand, have been insistent on convincing their Western partners that China's peaceful rise does not threaten anyone and that the West can rely on Beijing. Kissinger quotes Jiang Zemin as saying during a 2001 meeting with members of the American-Chinese Society that "positive cooperation between China and the United States is important for the whole world. We will do our best to achieve this."¹³.As Kissinger points out, the end of Jiang Zemin's presidency was a turning point in U.S.-China relations. In the subsequent period, relations developed as "co-existence on the basis of cooperation". At the same time, the parties have not developed a common concept: what should the world order be like? China's partner or opponent? What does the future hold for the parties - cooperation or confrontation?

The course of close partnership with China was also adopted by the Obama administration, which was strongly pushed by the American expert community. The November (2009) visit of the new American President to China**was successful. In a joint statement following the consultations of the two leaders, the state and prospects of cooperation on 5 main directions were outlined.-

* It seems that this was the usual pre-election rhetoric of B. Clinton, reinforced by euphoria in the United States about the "triumph of democracy" in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (by the way, we recall that Beijing also contributed to this "triumph", as G. Kissinger eloquently testifies). Empty declarations about the protection of "human rights" were worthless in foreign policy terms even after the Democrats came to power in 1993, but, as always, they were popular in America itself. China almost disappeared from the Clinton administration's field of view, having lost its value as a counterweight to the Soviet Union and not yet representing a serious global force at that time. The White House is bogged down in foreign economic affairs, which were listed as its main foreign policy priority (a significant trade deficit with Japan, the ratification of the North American free Trade Agreement, the first APEC summit in Seattle in 1973, the Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1974), as well as in foreign policy problems related to the restructuring of the system international relations after the end of the cold war. The situation began to change during the second presidency of B. Clinton, as China's economic power increased, its export "expansion", and Beijing's rapprochement with Moscow began to take shape. At the same time, "the existence of major disagreements on the issue of human rights"¹¹, recorded in a joint US-Chinese communique during Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States in 1997, did not prevent either the visit or Clinton's proclamation of China as a "strategic partner of the United States" in 1998 (editor's note by E. Rusakov).

** For more information, see: Davydov A. S. "The Chinese Puzzle" of the Obama Administration / / Asia and Africa Today, 2010, N 4 (editor's note).

Yah: China-US relations, developing and deepening strategic trust between the two countries, economic cooperation and global economic recovery, regional and global challenges, climate change, energy and the environment. The leitmotif of the statement was the thesis that the United States and China intend to consistently strengthen partnership in addressing common challenges, expand the base of cooperation and joint responsibility on many major issues of global stability and prosperity.¹⁴

At the same time, the three-decade-long rapid growth of China's economic and aggregate power, including an increase in its military capabilities, has caused growing concern in US political and military circles. China's position in East and South-East Asia has significantly strengthened. China has taken the place of the United States as the main trading partner of Japan, South Korea, many ASEAN countries, and Taiwan. It plays an active role in regional organizations of the Asia-Pacific region and in the life of the region as a whole. Due to the active expansion of the PRC in foreign markets, Western politicians, Kissinger notes, are actively calling on China to change the exchange rate of the yuan, increase domestic consumption in order to promote the recovery of the world economy.

Kissinger particularly carefully analyzes China's desire to strengthen its role in regional and world affairs, relying on its increased financial and economic capabilities, and the manifestation of increasingly nationalistic, "triumphalist" ("victorious") trends in the works of Chinese political scientists. As an example, the books "China is not Happy", "Chinese Dream" and others published in China are cited. Although these books have been criticized by the Chinese authorities, who have expressed their disagreement with the ideas contained in them and pointed out that they do not reflect the actual position of the PRC, Kissinger nevertheless believes that at least part of the Chinese establishment can adhere to the opinion expressed in the books.

Kissinger notes another peculiarity in relations between the United States and China that emerged during the Obama administration: while the leaders of both countries declare their commitment to consultation and even partnership between the parties, the press and elites of the two countries are increasingly saying the opposite.

However, both sides are making efforts to maintain good relations. An important role in this regard, Kissinger writes, was played by the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to the United States in January 2011. The joint statement notes that due to the fact that the two countries face important common challenges, the PRC and the United States decided to continue developing partnership in order to promote common interests, eliminate common problems, and strengthen international responsibility.¹⁵

Kissinger attaches great importance to the mechanism of Strategic and economic dialogue between the two sides, which covers both strategic and economic areas of cooperation between the two countries in world affairs-from strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, especially in connection with the DPRK and Iran's ambitions in this area, resolving regional conflicts, improving ties between the US and Chinese military departments, and overcoming the global financial crisis ¹⁶.

Yet the former Secretary of State has repeatedly asked himself whether it is possible to build a genuine partnership and a world order based on partnership. Can China and the United States develop genuine strategic trust?

Kissinger sets out his vision in this regard in the epilogue of the work. He fears that the logic of confrontation could lead the US and China to a sharp confrontation, if not to war. Everything must be done to avoid such a scenario. According to Kissinger, a cooperative relationship between the United States and China is "essential for global stability and peace." "A cold war between the two countries will stop progress for an entire generation on both sides of the Pacific. It will create divisions in the internal politics of each region at a time when nuclear non-proliferation, the environment, energy security, and climate change all call for global cooperation. " ¹⁷

Nevertheless, Kissinger points out, there are objective and subjective reasons that push the parties to confrontation. In this connection, Kissinger touches on the circumstances that led to the First World War. Reunited and transformed into a powerful state at the beginning of the 20th century, Germany felt the need to build up its muscles, including large-scale construction of the navy. England saw this as a deadly threat to itself, and began to strengthen its armed forces. The Entente was formed, which alone could resist Germany. As a result, war became inevitable.

Something similar, Kissinger notes, is happening in US-China relations, although-unlike the Anglo-German confrontation-today there are all the prerequisites to avoid such a course of events. "Relations between China and the United States cannot - and should not-become a zero-sum game", with one winning and the other inevitably losing ¹⁸. In the current turbulent world, both countries have many common interests, and the best way for them would be to "evolve together", solve the problems they face together, and minimize conflicts. This-

However, the Chinese side fears that the United States is trying to contain China, create a counterweight to China from its neighbors, and the Americans have the impression that Beijing would like to push the United States out of Asia. In this regard, Kissinger notes that by trying to win over as many countries as possible to create a counterweight to each other, neither the United States nor China will be able to achieve their goals, since the American presence is considered by the APR countries as a necessary stabilizing factor, and China is "an indispensable trading partner for most of its neighbors."

The way out of this situation, Kissinger believes, would be to create a Pacific Community, to unite the efforts of the main countries of the region in building a unified, not polarized system. As possible participants in such a system, Kissinger names, in addition to the United States and China, Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, India and Australia, ignoring Russia.

Describing the current state of US-China relations, it should be said that they seem to be developing exactly according to the scenario that Kissinger warned against.

There is a growing confrontation between China and the United States, which have taken a course to "contain" the PRC. The policy of "returning the United States to Asia" based on its traditional allies has been proclaimed. It is stated that the 21st century will be the Pacific century in US politics. Washington's role in regional organizations in the Asia-Pacific region has significantly increased. The United States has joined those of them where it did not participate until recently.

This line was reinforced by the recent large-scale steps taken by the United States to further strengthen its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. On January 6, 2012, President Barack Obama outlined at the Pentagon a new US military strategy, the center of gravity of which will be the Asia-Pacific region-with a certain curtailment of American military activity in other parts of the world. In general, it provides for strengthening the naval and air components of the US policy in the Pacific; further deployment of a large-scale global and regional missile defense system aimed at East Asia; strengthening military bases on Guam and Okinawa with the allocation of large funds for this; deployment of US Marines in Australia; increasing military assistance to the US allies in the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, a new powerful military complex is being created in the South Pacific*.

According to many foreign political analysts, all this activity is carried out with a clear aim at China and the South China Sea region, where Washington, despite declaring its neutrality, in fact, takes the side of the coastal countries of the region in their territorial disputes with China.

Under the" umbrella " of American obligations to protect Japan are the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku), now controlled by Japan.

Judging by the assessments of Chinese political scientists and the press, these steps of the United States are considered in China as a serious challenge that requires an adequate response from the Chinese side. At the same time, official Beijing prefers to show restraint and caution for the time being, trying to deflect American accusations of China's military buildup, pointing out that China has no expansionist aspirations and emphasizing China's interest in further strengthening and developing relations with the United States, "properly resolving differences."

Nevertheless, China is by no means going to abandon its policy in the region and in the world. The policy of systematically increasing military spending and modernizing the People's Liberation Army of China19 continues, a tough stance is taken on territorial issues, and plans to turn the PRC into a "mighty maritime power" were announced at the XVIII CPC Congress 20.

* For more information, see: Leksyutina Ya. V. USA-China: Rivalry in Southeast Asia is getting Worse // Asia and Africa Today, 2012, N 3; Semin A.V. Triangle USA-China-Japan and the Asia-Pacific region / / Aliya and Africa Today, 2012, N 9 (editor's note).

^{Henry Kissinger.} 1 About China, Astrel Publ., 2012.

² Ibid., p. 19.

³ Ibid., pp. 137-138.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 234-235.

⁵ Ibid., p. 256.

⁶ Ibid., p. 390.

⁷ Ibid., p. 403.

⁸ Ibid., p. 447.

⁹ Ibid., p. 487.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 491.

¹¹ China-US Joint Statement (October 29,1997) // Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America -http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/ zywj/t36259.htm

^{Henry Kissinger.} 12 Edict. op., p. 497.

¹³ Ibid., p. 514.

¹⁴ The White House Office of the Press Secretary. November 17, 2009. U.S. -China Joint Statement. Beijing, China http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement; People's Daily online, 17.11.2009 - http://russian. people.com.cn/3l52l/6815798.html; http://russian.people.com.en/31521/ 6815909.html; http://russian.people.com.cn/ 31521/6815943.html; http://russian.people. com.cn/31521/6815655.html

¹⁵ Hu Jintao completed his state visit to the United States and left for his homeland / / Xinhua News Agency, 22.01.2011 - http://rus-sian.cri.cn/841/2011/01/22/ls368251.htm

¹⁶ The White House Press Office. Statement on Bilateral Meeting with President Hu of China. 1.04.2009 - http://www.white-house.gov/

^{Henry Kissinger.} 17 Edict. soch., p. 556.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 557.

¹⁹ For more information, see: Yurlov F. N. China, India and the USA: the correlation of forces is changing / / Asia and Africa Today, 2013, N 2.

²⁰ He calls for efforts to build China into maritime power // Xinhua, Nov. 8 -http://news.xinhuanet.eom/english/speciai/1 8cpcnc/2012-H/08/c_131959403.htm

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