The disclosure, although incomplete, of the archives of the highest Soviet state and party organs made it possible to study historical events, the coverage of which for many years was based on concepts that were far from reality. Among these events, in our opinion, the so-called Basma movement in Soviet Turkestan is of great scientific interest.

In the autumn of 1920, the despotic regime of the Emir of Bukhara, Seyid Alim Khan, was overthrown and the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (BNSR) was proclaimed. In Moscow, this was regarded as a major success in implementing the strategy leading to the victory of the world revolution. However, as representatives of the RSFSR were convinced on the spot, the situation there was very difficult. In particular, the insurgency began, and the sources of its material supply were located in Afghanistan-beyond the reach of the Red Army units, the only real force capable of fighting the uprising, as it turned out. As noted in one of the reports of Soviet military intelligence, "on May 2, an Emir's official Khojakulov arrived in Mazar-i-Sherif, who was entrusted by the former emir with the leadership of operations in the Baisun region," and the emir's agents spread rumors that the Afghan and British governments " have pledged to assist the rebellion against the Russian Bolsheviks and their allies in the capital of Bukhara - mladobukhartsev" 1 . By November 1921, most of Eastern Bukhara was under rebel control.

Even before these events began, it was clear to the Soviet leadership that Afghanistan had an extremely important role to play in the success or failure of grandiose plans to launch revolutionary transformations in Central and South Asia. In particular, it was to become a base for exporting the revolution to India - one of the primary goals of the Comintern. Meanwhile, it was necessary to take into account that among the Afghan political elite, after the collapse of the caliphate in Turkey, the ideas of creating a new caliphate centered in Kabul and including vast areas of Central Asia, including Bukhara, were very popular. In the post-BNSR situation, it was extremely important for Moscow to switch Kabul's attention to the southern direction of its foreign policy, i.e., to India. She considered this task extremely difficult, given the controversial position of the man who came to power in 1919. Amanullah Khan. The new ruler, a very ambitious man, was full of bright hopes for turning the country into a powerful regional power. The ideological design of his plans was found in the thesis of uniting the peoples of the East on the basis of belonging to Islam. In this scheme, Kabul was to occupy a niche created after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The success of the planned grandiose enterprise would have been impossible without activation on two fronts - southern and northern. In the south, the task is with-

page 56

It was responsible for driving the British out of the predominantly Muslim western part of India, primarily from the northwestern regions occupied by Pashtun tribes. But this was impossible without a large-scale armed conflict with London. A military solution was also thought of in the north, where Afghanistan, if the plan was implemented, was to actively intervene in the armed struggle that unfolded in the former Bukhara Emirate.

Soviet analysts believed that the policy of Kabul towards Bukhara and Soviet Russia was due to the influence of factors that go beyond the "actual Afghan" interests: "The development of Soviet construction and the strengthening of communism in the East is becoming dangerous for the nationalist pan-Islamic world. The unification of the East can occur in two ways: either by the victory of reaction "by the triumph of the dominant groups of Islam, or by the unification of the working people through the creation of Soviet power". 2

Moscow understood that the material resources of Afghanistan were completely insufficient to launch an offensive simultaneously in the north and in the south, and believed that Amanullah Khan would try to use the Anglo-Soviet contradictions. Consequently, the task was to make Soviet Russia a friend, although there were no illusions about the true attitude of official Kabul towards it.

In 1919, hostilities broke out on the Afghan-Indian border. According to Soviet experts, " the break with England was influenced by the humiliation that Turkey suffered under the Sevres Peace, which preserved its independence... the halo of the head of the Muslim world." In addition, a movement for uniting Muslims in defense of the Caliphate has begun in India. Full of confidence that the RSFSR would not use the Anglo-Afghan complications for territorial gains at the expense of Afghanistan and seeking to appear in the eyes of Muslims as a defender of the caliphate, Amanullah Khan, responding to the sentiments of the circles of the highest clergy and independent tribes, opened military operations against England. Acting cautiously, he initially used the militias of the border tribes, while the regular troops remained in reserve positions.

The British eventually succeeded and forced the emir to make peace. But "the emir became more independent with the right to direct diplomatic relations with foreign powers, which increased his authority to an unprecedented height... But at the same time, the Emir's treasury suffered a serious loss, because to prove his independence, the Emir refused a permanent subsidy received by him and his predecessors from the Anglo-Indian government" 3

Analysts of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, assessing relations with Afghanistan, wrote:: "The recognition of Afghanistan's independence by the RSFSR government, the Afghan Embassy in Moscow, and the appearance of the Russian embassy in Kabul opened the way for Afghanistan to be recognized by the European powers... But at the same time, Afghanistan is stubbornly striving to achieve the return of Kushka and the Pendi oasis. It is well known that a note was recently sent to the Bukhgovernment expressing amazement at the lack of independence of the BNSR and the use of revolutionary emblems that are contrary to Sharia law. In addition, the Emir of Bukhara received a warm welcome in Afghanistan and all the leaders of the Bukhara counter-revolution gathered there... In general, the Afghan government is a serious opponent, currently pursuing a military-state policy and dreaming of the role of a Muslim hegemon in Central Asia" (emphasis added. - V. G. ) 4 . In another document 5 Also related to the initial period of the BNSR's existence, it contains a forecast of the possible development of Afghanistan's policy towards Bukhara and the RSFSR: "After the defeat on the Indian side-

page 57

The entire consolidation of Afghanistan's position is possible only by consolidating the reactionary state and stopping the offensive movement of the revolution in the East. The weakness of the forces is the main constraint in Afghanistan's politics. Therefore, it is quite possible that Afghanistan will reduce its policy to creating serious internal difficulties for us, which would discredit the policy of the Soviet government in the East. Fighting... In Bukhara, against the Soviet Bukharian government, against the union of Bukhara with Soviet Russia, there is the first direction in this."

On February 28, 1921, an agreement was signed in Moscow between the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs G. V. Chicherin and his deputy L. M. Karakhan, on the one hand, and an Afghan delegation consisting of Muhamed Wali Khan, Mirza Muhamed Khan and Ghulam Sidyk Khan, on the other, providing for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the RSFSR and Afghanistan 6 Secret annexes to the text of the treaty contained very important provisions on the military and economic assistance that the Soviet side had pledged to provide to Afghanistan: a gratuitous annual allowance of one million rubles in gold, the equipment of the Kushka-Herat-Kand Agar-Kabul telegraph line; sending technical and other specialists to the disposal of the Afghan government, 12 aircraft, and an aviation school, two or four batteries of anti-aircraft guns, 5,000 rifles "with the necessary supply of ammunition" and, finally, the establishment of a factory for the production of smokeless powder 7 . The treaty was supposed to enter into force after it was ratified by both parties. The Afghan side ratified the treaty largely thanks to the skill of the Soviet envoy F. F. Raskolnikov, who arrived in Kabul in the summer of 1921, who believed that its success was to some extent due to the clumsy actions of the British representatives in Kabul.

Despite the well-known achievements in the implementation of Soviet policy towards Afghanistan, the Soviet ambassador was far from euphoric and did not believe that the threat of Afghan intervention on the side of opponents of Soviet power in the ongoing armed struggle in Central Asia, primarily in Bukhara, had been eliminated. He expressed his thoughts on this issue in a message to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs G. V. Chicherin on November 26, 1921. 8 Having received information about the uprising in Eastern Bukhara, the Afghans "began to strenuously offer military assistance to restore order and calm," citing concern for the fate of the "friendly Muslim population." But at the same time, they reproached Soviet Russia for using Red Army units on the territory of Bukhara. Moreover, Raskolnikov did not rule out that the" painful interest "of Kabul, which he continues to show in Bukhara, may result in a madcap military action by entering there" under the most friendly pretexts " of its military forces. At the same time, the Soviet side will be confronted "with an accomplished fact." However, he considered such a development unlikely, given the interest of Amanullah Khan in the Soviet military aid that had already begun to arrive in Afghanistan. And yet, as the Soviet envoy believed," we must be prepared for this, " given the extremely unstable and subject to constant fluctuations of Amanullah Khan's policy towards Soviet Russia. In this situation, Raskolnikov believed that Moscow should show flexibility and restraint, combined with vigilance and the necessary firmness.

Following Raskolnikov's recommendations, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) at its meeting on January 27-31, 1922, opposed Kabul's attempts to put pressure on the BNSR government in order to encourage it, if not to interrupt, then to weaken military-political cooperation with the RSFSR. In the resolution adopted at the end of January 1922. 9 Decisive demarches were planned in Bukhara and Kabul: "In view of the presentation by the Afghan government of a note to the Bukhara government, clearly inspired by the Entente and containing an attempt to play on pan-Islamism.

page 58

of the Bukhara government, to recognize the need for a strong protest to the Bukhara and Afghan governments", to demand the recall of the Afghan ambassador from Bukhara and "non-interference in the internal affairs of Bukhara from now on". At the same time, the Soviet leadership continued to provide assistance to Afghanistan. On March 22 this question was raised in a letter from G. V. Chicherin to I. V. Stalin 10 : "Dear comrade. All those who are currently close to our relations with Afghanistan insist in the strongest possible terms that delaying the delivery to the Afghans of weapons prepared for them in Kushka and subject to delivery to them would be the most harmful and disastrous step." Chicherin pointed out that according to information received by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, "this will cause the greatest excitement in the Afghan government and may push it to the most hostile actions."

The Soviet leadership continued to provide assistance to Afghanistan, despite the intervention of Kabul in Bukhara affairs. According to the military intelligence of the Turkestan Front, during 1922 Afghanistan continued to actively assist the insurgents 11 "Enver's personal guard consisted of 180 Afghans... A transport of 80 camels with weapons and ammunition arrived from Afghanistan." It was noted that reinforcements for the insurgents were arriving from Afghanistan, which, however, did not satisfy the rebel leaders. So, Arifov , one of the prominent leaders of the BNSR military apparatus, who defected to the Basmachi side, sent a request for reinforcements to Afghanistan.

Attempts by Afghan diplomatic representatives to undermine the BNSD from within also continued. On July 6, 1922, an underground anti-government organization was uncovered in Bukhara, and one of the closest relatives of the former emir, who received financial assistance from him, was arrested. The investigation established that the organization was headed by an Afghan consul. All this was reported by the BNSR plenipotentiary to the RSFSR personally to Stalin 12 . The secret war that Afghanistan was actually waging against the RSFSR spread to the territory of the Turkestan ASSR, where the insurgency was very active in the Ferghana region. So, according to Soviet counterintelligence, one of the leaders of the rebels, Kurshirmat, sent a delegation to Kabul, where it was received by Amanullah Khan himself. The latter allegedly instructed Kurshirmat to convey gratitude on his own behalf for the fight against the Bolsheviks 13 According to the same information, Kurshirmat sent "young Muslims to Afghanistan for military training, which was done at the suggestion of Kabul." At the beginning of April 1922, Kurshirmat sent to Afghanistan kurbashi Haidar, who delivered valuable gifts there; it was also indicated that "propaganda work" was being carried out with calls "for the autonomy of Turkestan and Islam" 14

As noted in Soviet intelligence reports dating back to the same year 1922, the Basmachi are trying to "provoke the natives by issuing false reports about our defeats and losses in battles" 15 They were prepared by a " secret Central Asian Muslim organization with a center abroad." On May 17, 1922, the Authorized Representative of the GPU in the Turkestan Republic, referring to the data of the Special Department of the Turkestan Front, informed the center 16 that the Afghan government is actively involved in the Basmachi movement in Bukhara: "Enver Pasha has been sent weapons and a detachment of regular troops. The next step is to send infantry. The Afghan border towns and the border itself are reinforced with troops as never before... there is a movement of troops, a change of command staff, road repairs, fortifications, mobilization of people and horses. The Minister of War arrived in Iman Sahib. The arrival of such people in the province is conditioned on possible upcoming military operations." The Minister of War allegedly said that the Afghan government "will send up to 8,000 regular troops to Bukhara... A headquarters has been set up in Afghan Turkestan to direct the Bukhara movement and supply it with people and weapons."

page 59

It should be noted that the assumptions of those who predicted a large-scale intervention of Afghanistan in the armed struggle between the Soviet government and the insurgents were not justified, and, consequently, the course of Moscow's policy towards Kabul turned out to be correct. At the very climax of the uprising in Eastern Bukhara under Enver Pasha's leadership, Amanullah Khan did not dare to give the latter real support and try to save him from defeat. Moreover, Khan has taken some steps to appease Moscow. On September 1, 1922, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan assured F. F. Raskolnikov 17 that his " government did not and does not have any intentions of incitement that would be directed against the government of Soviet Russia and does not provide a place for organizations hostile to the Russian government."

For my part. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) decided to accept the limited assistance of Afghanistan to the insurgents in Central Asia, as it considered it possible to use Amanullah Khan in its policy in the East as a counterweight to the influence of England. It should be noted that by the end of 1922 and the beginning of 1923, the insurgent movement in Eastern Bukhara, after a certain decline in the summer months of 1922 as a result of the defeat of its main forces and the death of Enver Pasha, revived again. A certain impact, obviously, was the continued assistance to Afghanistan, which Moscow had a fairly clear idea of from strategic intelligence. We will refer to the reports of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the OGPU in Central Asia and the military intelligence of the Turkestan Front for 1923: "Communication with Afghanistan. February 1923. According to the agency's information, detachments of Turkmens and White emigrants are being formed on the Afghan territory in the Kelif, Khanabad, Andkhoy and Devlet-Abad districts as of 30.1. Former Emir officials are actively involved in the organization..., b Turkish officers were sent from Afghanistan to the Kerki region to organize the command of the emerging detachments..., up to 300 horsemen have already been organized in the Ahcha region, and up to 700 horsemen in the Shibirgan region. The Fang Mergen detachment is supposedly one of the first formed in Afghanistan, from where it receives weapons and ammunition."

Despite this, at the end of March 1923, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) decided "to recognize it necessary to enter into negotiations with the Afghan Government regarding the payment of the previously promised part of the subsidy in the amount of 500,000 rubles." However, as a condition of this payment, it was decided to consider compensation for damage caused by the actions of Basmachi who crossed from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan, " the opening of the Russian consulate in Meimen, the creation of mixed control commissions in those areas of Afghanistan from which invasions often occur..., the eviction of the most odious elements from Afghanistan, a list of which will be presented." In addition, the payment must be made by "a special decision of the Central Committee after the report of the NKID on the agreement reached in the negotiations" 19 . As far as can be judged from the surviving materials, Afghanistan continued to support the insurgency in Central Asia in the future, but on an incomparably more modest scale than in 1921-1922. After the death of Enver Pasha and a short period of command of the "holy army of Islam" by another Turkish officer, Selim Pasha, the latter was forced to leave for Afghanistan, where his followers, according to local authorities, were disarmed. But the command of the insurgents was transferred to Ibrahim Bek, who, according to Soviet intelligence, acted "strictly at the behest of Afghanistan" 20 The former emir of Bukhara still occupied a luxurious residence in the town of Kalai Fatum near Kabul, receiving an annual subsidy of 150,000 rupees from the Afghan government. 21 The foreign office was also located there

page 60

the center of control of the rebel movement in Eastern Bukhara, which was the last hotbed of Basmachism.

The year 1924 was marked by the gradual decline of the insurgent movement in present-day Tajikistan, the departure of the remnants of Basma formations and their leading leaders to Afghanistan, and at the same time an acute internal political crisis there, an indicator of which was the rebellion in Khost. The position of the Soviet leadership in relation to Afghanistan remained the same, despite the fact that Amanullah Khan's policy on the "Bukhara" issue did not change.

On April 29, 1924, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) decided to " accept the proposals of tt. Stalin, Trotsky, and Chicherin to be extradited to Afghanistan immediately... one million rubles and sending 2-3 experienced Muslim workers to Afghanistan" 22 . Over the following months, the Politburo turned its attention back to Afghan issues. This was due to Moscow's clear concern about the fate of Amanullah Khan's regime, which continued to be precarious. At a meeting on August 14, 1924, held in an atmosphere of special secrecy 23 It was decided to request the RVS of the Turkfront about its assessment of the situation in Afghanistan and "the measures that it would consider necessary to take in connection with the Afghan events." On August 21, apparently, after receiving detailed information from the Turkfront headquarters, received on August 19, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs G. V. Chicherin was asked to provide urgent military assistance to Kabul: "a) release ... 5000 rifles and ammunition, 50-100 machine guns with cartridges, 3 radio stations; b) speed up the transfer of airplanes located in Kushka together with pilots; c) send pilots for the existing airplanes in Afghanistan." Monitoring the implementation of this decision was entrusted to the Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR I. S. Unshlikht.

During 1924, ten aircraft were sent to Afghanistan with Soviet crews who also took part in strikes against the insurgents. Another striking force of the government forces - artillery - was reinforced by the supply of equipment from the USSR in the amount of more than 600 thousand rubles. 24

Nevertheless, Amanullah Khan did not abandon the ideological basis of his foreign policy - pan-Islamism. This conclusion was made by an authoritative meeting with the participation of leading party and state workers in Central Asia (F. A. Yushchenko). Khodjaev, K. Ikramov, and others) in early 1925. They agreed with the assessments of L. N. Belsky, who headed the OGPU Plenipotentiary Office in Central Asia and one of F. E. Dzerzhinsky's closest associates. According to him, after the collapse of "conservative pan-Islamism", which was centered on the Constantinople caliphate before the defeat of Turkey in World War I, Amanullah Khan and the ideologue of the "young Afghans" Mahmud Tarzi replaced the Ottoman "sultan-caliph" and his entourage, and pan-Islamism is based on the military-political alliance of Afghanistan, Kemalist Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Of Iran 25 .

Normalization of the situation in Central Asia was slow. Some regions of Uzbekistan (Surkhandarya region and present-day Tajikistan), according to the Turkestan Front command, and in 1925 "continued to remain the most dysfunctional in terms of the number of various Basman groups continuing to operate" 26 . The duration of the Basmachist agony in this region was attributed to continued support from northern Afghanistan, especially from such centers as Mazar-I-Sharif, Khanabad, Rustak, and Andkhoy. From here, the former Emir of Bukhara continued to maintain regular contacts with his supporters and provide them with assistance. According to Soviet intelligence, " during 1925, Said-bek, Togan-bek and Akram Khan-Tyurya (prominent Basmian leaders. - V. G .).. . They organized couriers crossing the border with Soviet Tajikistan and prepared documents for them." 27

page 61

But as in 1923-1924, the Afghan authorities ' support for the insurgents was very modest. This was due to Amanullah Khan's fear of complicating relations with the Soviet Union, which supported him in the fight against internal opposition and Britain; in addition, the victory of the anti-Soviet insurgency in Tajikistan was unprofitable for Amanullah Khan, since the rebels were supported by non-Pashtun tribal nobility in the north of the country, who were dissatisfied with the fact that even under Amanullah they were not allowed to. At the same time, the complete defeat of the Basma movement in Tajikistan was also unprofitable for Amanullah Khan and the Pashtun elite, as it would have entailed mass emigration of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmens to Northern Afghanistan, where their tribesmen lived.

Soviet analysts understood the peculiar situation in which Kabul was located. The materials of political and military intelligence noted that the top of the insurgent movement in Tajikistan "always seeks to receive the maximum amount of assistance from Afghanistan" and generally "draw this country into a joint struggle", which is unprofitable for the Kabul regime. But the Afghan Government is not in a position, even if it wanted to, to act decisively against providing aid to the insurgents. Moreover, the measures taken "as a result of our diplomatic pressure do not have a particularly great result... not because of the connivance of the government", but because of "the weakness of the state apparatus", and therefore "it is physically impossible to exercise control over the activities of Basmachs who freely cross the border with the USSR in both directions" 28 . It is also interesting to note the Soviet intelligence officers, referring to the same time, i.e., to 1926. "There is information that the afg [An] government keeps[the former Emir of Bukhara in the country] and does not send him to India for fear that both he and his entourage will be used by the British" 29 Obviously, in an effort to thwart the plans of the military leader of the Tajik insurgents, Ibrahim Bek, who moved to Afghanistan under pressure from the Red Army in June 1926, Kabul tried to prevent him from creating an infrastructure of power in the north of the country. This is understandable, because he sought not only to restore the combat capability and unity of disparate groups of Basmachi who fled to Afghanistan and establish ties with groups of activists of Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik emigration who were entrenched in the north, but also to seize leadership among the non-Pashtun population of northern Afghanistan in order to create a separate state here.

All these circumstances were especially evident in 1927-1928, when, against the background of the further decline of the insurgent movement in Tajikistan, a new crisis of the regime that assumed the royal (shah's) title of Amanullah Shah began. Back in September, 1927, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), in an atmosphere of strict secrecy (its minutes were kept in one of the" special folders"), a resolution was adopted that emphasized the immutability of support for the Kabul ruler. In the resolution adopted on September 15, 1927. 30 , it was stated that "by September 1, 1927, on the basis of the contract, the Afghan government was transferred to the subsidy account:

a) currencies of 1250000 rubles.;

b) artimushchestva in the amount of 75,000 rubles.;

c) artimushchestvo during the Khosta uprising (in the amount of 607378 rubles 81 kopecks);

d) not received for spare parts sold at different times (for equipment and weapons) 594803 rubles. 84 kopecks.

8 aircraft, 6 anti-aircraft guns and five thousand rifles with the necessary supply of ammunition were transferred from the property...

4. Less 2666803 rubles transferred to the subsidy account 84 kopecks. it remains to transfer another 3333,198 rubles by the autumn of 1927, to retrofit a factory for the production of smokeless gunpowder and an aviation school.

page 62

5. By a decision of the instance (Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). - V. G. ) it is considered necessary to release weapons worth 4 million rubles to Afghanistan in two terms. By two million at the beginning of the year, and by the remaining two million at the end of the year. Of these four million, three million should be transferred to the subsidy account, and 1 [million] should be paid to Afghanistan in the form of arms sales. After the transfer of weapons for the specified amount by January 1928, the debt (on account of subsidies under the 1921 treaty) will amount to 1133196 rubles. 41 kopecks. 2 anti-aircraft guns, 4 aircraft were not delivered, and the obligation to build a factory and create an aviation school was not fulfilled...

8. Consider it necessary to hand over to the Afghan Government the 4 aircraft and 2 anti-aircraft guns stipulated by the 1921 treaty... To the People's Commissar of Finance of the U.S.S.R. to allocate 420 thousand rubles for the restoration of the specified property during the 1927/28 budget year."

The Politburo began discussing measures to provide military and economic assistance to Afghanistan just as a new acute political crisis broke out in that country. Amanullah Khan's reforms after the end of the war with Britain in 1919, despite their progressive significance - undermining the foundations of the feudal system, modernizing the law, creating a modern industry, changing the financial system, military construction, expanding secular schools, etc. - caused opposition not only from the traditional elite, but also from the general population. This was due to insufficient consideration of the traditional foundations of Afghan society. The situation of the grassroots has worsened to a certain extent, which has been exploited by conservative groups supported from outside. In 1928, mass riots escalated into an armed uprising that initially engulfed the northern regions of the country - Kuhistan and Kohdaman, and then - two-thirds of Afghanistan. Amanullah Shah's situation is becoming critical. Government soldiers, mostly peasants, go over to the side of the insurgents, whose leader is a certain Habibullah, a semi-literate Tajik peasant who served in the army for a while and then became a professional robber, a kind of Afghan Robin Hood. This highly controversial figure ,the" son of the water carrier", Bacha I Sacao 31 by the end of 1928, he managed to win. The Muslim clergy of the Northern District accepted fatwa, in which Amanullah Shah was called the instigator of debauchery and rebellion, the faithful were released from the obligation to obey him, and his place was to be taken by Habibullah-Bacha-i-Sakao, " servant of the people, zealot of religion."

On January 14, 1929, after the defeat of government forces near Kabul, Amanullah Shah decided to leave the capital. Accompanied by a small group of his followers and six bodyguards, he took 10 million rupees and left by car in the direction of Kandahar. Before that, he handed over the management of state affairs to his brother Inayatullah. The rebels seized the capital, and on January 17, Inayatullah signed an agreement on his abdication and swore an oath of loyalty to Habibullah, who, in turn, pledged to guarantee the safety of all his family and the possibility of traveling to Kandahar or outside the country. On January 18, Habibullah declared himself King of Afghanistan, appointing his brother Hamidullah as his heir.

The Soviet government considered the coming to power of Bacha y Sacao a coup d'etat in which the British were involved. The Soviet envoy was recalled from Kabul, but diplomatic relations were not interrupted-the Soviet mission was temporarily headed by Adviser E. M. Ricks, while consulates in Mazar-I-Sharif, Meimen and Herat continued to work. Until the end of May 1929, Moscow continued to hope for the return of Amanullah Shah to Kabul. Practical measures in this direction were led by Stalin himself, without the knowledge of the NKID and even the OGPU. He met with the Foreign Minister of the deposed but still in Afghanistan Amanullah Shah, Ghulam Sidyk Khan (Charkhi), after which a plan of Soviet-Afghan cooperation was developed.-

page 63

military operation. Formally, it was headed by the former Afghan government's ambassador to Moscow, Ghulam Haidar Khan, who had the rank of general, graduated from a Turkish military school, an energetic man who knew Russian well. But the real leader of the whole enterprise was the famous Soviet military commander V. M. Primakov, at one time a military attache in Kabul.

The operation began on April 15, 1929, when a detachment consisting of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, dressed in Afghan uniforms (although there were also Afghan officers), crossed into the Afghan territory in the Termez region. The detachment numbered (according to various sources) from 800 to 2000 people, was armed with machine guns and artillery pieces, and was supported from the air by six Soviet Air Force aircraft. The operation seemed to be progressing well. Having broken the resistance of the Afghan military units loyal to Kabul, the detachment approached Mazar-I-Sharif and captured it on April 19. Advancing towards Kabul, the attackers defeated a group of about 4,000 people led by the new government's Defense Minister, Syed Hussein. But on May 30, it became known that Amanullah decided to stop fighting and, after leaving Afghanistan, went to India, and then to Europe.

Meanwhile, the new regime in Kabul immediately began to eliminate the reforms hated by conservative circles. But what worried Moscow most was that Bacha y Sacao was beginning to show signs of hostility to the USSR. Tajik Bacha-i - Sakao was actively supported by the leaders of Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen emigration from the USSR, who saw in him, among other things, an anti-Pashtun leader who could change the situation in the north of Afghanistan that was favorable for the separatists. The report of the commissioner of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR in Uzbekistan, drawn up on February 24, 1929, when the fate of the regime of Amanullah Shah was still undecided, noted: "In recent days, negotiations were held between Bacha-i-Sakao, the Buh[Ar] emir and Ibrahim-bek, the main content of which was the question of joint actions against Bukhara and Tajikistan. Ibrahim beg insisted on active actions "immediately after the suppression of the resistance of the supporters of the deposed Amanullah Shah who still remained in the north of the country," promising to urgently organize a " detachment of 4,000 people." Bacha y Sacao allegedly "agreed", but at the same time stated that it was impossible to participate in such a large enterprise on the Soviet side "with the available forces". In his opinion, before the whole of Afghanistan is subordinated, this would pose a threat to the new government. Bache-i-Sakao suggested that Ibrahim bek move his forces to Kabul to complete the fight against Amanullah Shah. In the end, Ibrahim Beg agreed to send 1,000 fighters to Kabul. In the same report, it was noted that the former Emir of Bukhara "held a more moderate position and generally supported Bacha-i-Sakao" 32

Similar data was received in Moscow and through the channels of foreign intelligence. Just on February 24, 1929, the OGPU report stated: "The further events developed in the north of the country, the more clearly the role of the Bukhara and Turkmen emigration as an active supporter of the coup appeared. Trying to use the interest of Bacha-i-Sakao in their support, these circles in the person of Ibrahim-bek insist on opening military operations against Soviet Tajikistan" 33 By the beginning of the spring of 1929, the views of the leadership of the Soviet intelligence agencies, which closely followed the events in Afghanistan, became clearer.

On March 15, 1929, the OGPU Plenipotentiary Mission in Central Asia reported to the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b): "The Afghan events, which moved directly to the borders of the republics of Central Asia, caused great activity of the former Bukhara and Turkmen emigration. This activity was facilitated by the Bacha-i-Sacao law on the abolition of conscription and the formation of an armed force based on the generic principle on a voluntary basis. Bukhara emigration as a whole

стр. 64

the least well-off, not firmly settled and having experience of basmachism, serves as the main cadre for recruiting and forming detachments (Bacha-i-Sakao. - V. G .). To recruit emigrants, former Basmian leaders are used, who become the head of such detachments and report to local khakims (heads of county administrations. - V. G .). These forces are designed not only to protect internal order, but also to protect the border. It is enough to point out the appointment of Utan Bek (formerly one of the most prominent leaders of the Basmachi in Eastern Bukhara. - V. G. the head of the border guard against our Sarai section, Davlet Sardar-the head of the armed forces among the Turkmens, Ibrahim Bek-the commander of the Khanabad district troops, to understand that these detachments are intended more for operations on our territory than on the territory of Afghanistan" 34 The danger was compounded by the extreme weakness of the Soviet border troops in the region. Thus, with the length of the border with Afghanistan in 2128 km, its inviolability was ensured by only 1090 border guards 35 , t.e. on average, one person guarded two km of the border. The combat capability of the Soviet border guards was sharply reduced due to the spread of malaria, a lack of automatic weapons and communications equipment.

The Soviet state and the military leadership did not rule out that the matter would not be limited to the invasion of gangs, but a war would begin with the participation of not only Afghanistan, but also Iran, with massive support from British troops from India.

The author discovered a declassified archival document that covered the course of the staff game held by the command of the Central Asian Military District headed by P. E. Dybenko 38 The theme of the exercise was to repel the invasion of Tajikistan by the regular Afghan army and the subsequent counterattack on the territory of Afghanistan. At the same time, the task of the Red Army was to first prevent the Afghan invasion, and then "go on a decisive offensive, destroying enemy units operating in the Mazar-I-Sherif region, in order to ensure possible further movement to Kabul after the concentration of new forces."

Emir Habibullah's regime was short-lived. In October 1929, units under the command of a relative of Amanullah Shah, Nadir Khan, launched an offensive on Kabul. Soviet intelligence by this time had extensive information about Nadir Khan, having observed him since the time when in 1919-1920 he was the Minister of War and played a role in assisting the rebels in Eastern Bukhara. Although he disagreed with Amanullah Shah on a number of political issues, he was not a strong opponent of the USSR. In 1923, Nadir Khan was removed from the post of minister, but for the next three years he held the prestigious post of Ambassador to France and Belgium. In 1926, he retired and settled in Nice as a private citizen, closely following the course of events in Afghanistan. Apparently, he already considered himself a candidate for the throne in Kabul, although he did not openly claim it. In Tashkent and Moscow, he was treated with a certain suspicion, considering him a follower of the English orientation 37

At dawn on October 8, 1929, the troops under the command of Nadir Khan's brother, Shah Wali Khan, began a decisive battle for the capital, which ended with its capture. Habibullah, taking with him a considerable amount of gold bullion, fled. Having settled in Charikar, he held a meeting with representatives of the tribal elite of the north, urging them to continue the fight against the usurper. But his days were numbered. Nadir Khan, who arrived in Kabul on October 15, 1929, where he was declared emir, persuaded Habibullah to surrender, promising him an oath on the Koran of his inviolability. But soon he was killed along with a group of his followers, and their corpses were hung out for public display to intimidate. However, some supporters of Amanullah Shah were also repressed. The new government, headed by Nadir Khan, who adopted

page 65

then the title of padishah, returned to the feudal lords some privileges that were abolished by Amanullah Shah, restored the Muslim clergy to their former role in cultural policy, judicial proceedings and legislation, although under the control of secular authorities.

In Moscow and Tashkent, interested mainly in the foreign policy course of the new authorities in Kabul, they evaluated it very critically. Thus, the report of the Central Asian Military District headquarters dated October 26, 1929 stated that "the composition of the new government consists of obvious Anglophiles and reactionaries... confirms it... a point of view... on the winner of Habibullah, as a supporter of rapprochement with London" 38 . But Nadir Shah's policy was not so straightforward. He was a supporter of strengthening the power of the central government, which was incompatible with supporting anti-Soviet (and at the same time separatist) elements in the north of the country. However, he was also in no hurry to make a decisive break with them. At the headquarters of the Central Asian Military District, such a line was alarming.

So, in the "Review of Basmachestvo" as of May 15, 1930, compiled in the 4th (intelligence) The department of this headquarters stated that "the attitude towards Ibrahim beg on the part of Yaqub Khan (one of the members of the Kabul leadership close to Nadir Shah. - V. G. ), who arrived with broad authority (to the north. - V. G .) ... is ambiguous" if not indicative "of the cooperation of the Afghan authorities with the Basmachi ringleaders... Ibrahim's stay with his detachment in the Kunduz area (i.e. near the border with the USSR. - V. G .), as well as the continued recruitment of new people, raises the question of the possibility of moving to our territory and creates a new real threat to Soviet Tajikistan" 38 A similar point of view was held in those days not only by the military command, but also by the leadership of Soviet political intelligence. Thus, in a letter from the newly appointed Plenipotentiary Representative of the OGPU in Central Asia, L. G. Mironov, who had experience in the East (in the early 1920s, he was one of the heads of the branch of the Eastern Department of the OGPU in the North Caucasus), addressed to the chairman of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and It was reported that the Basmachi were preparing to raid Tajikistan with the knowledge of Nadir Shah. This allegedly followed from a letter from the former Emir of Bukhara, which was brought to Ibrahim Bey's headquarters in Aliabad by a special courier. According to Soviet political intelligence, Ibrahim Bey called a special meeting of the Kurbashi. As Mironov wrote, "intentions to move to our territory are confirmed by a number of sources... according to verified data, on May 16 from Termez, Ibrahim bey is preparing to move to our territory." 40

But all this did not mean that Nadir Shah was ready to support Moscow's enemies based in Afghanistan unconditionally. The factors that determined the ambivalent policy of Amanullah Shah were still important. Moreover, the position of the new ruler of Afghanistan was unstable, as the opposition in the North was not broken. The report of the Permanent Mission of the OGPU in Central Asia dated July 15, 1930 noted that "the fall and death of Bacha-i-Sakao and the rise of Nadir [in] Northern Afghanistan were regarded as a victory for the Afghans (i.e., the Pashtuns. - V. G. They will begin to restore their former position of dominance over the non-Afghan nationalities inhabiting northern Afghanistan, and the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens will lose the relative freedom and independence that Bacha-i - Sakao gave them." 41 According to Soviet political intelligence, such sentiments already in the spring of 1930 resulted in the preparation of "a general uprising of Afghan Turkestan under the slogans of achieving autonomy and independence." For Kabul, this development of the situation was very dangerous - " the Bukhara and Turkmen emigration became the head, as the most organizationally strong, cohesive stratum, which already had ready-made authoritative leaders - Ibra-

page 66

gim beg, Ishan Khalifa, branches, connections in all provinces, including Kabul...".

According to information available to the Soviet political leadership and military command, the situation in Afghanistan and on the Soviet border with it was threatening. Indeed, on June 3, 1930, a 300-strong gang under the command of Utan Bek crossed the border in lower Panj and attacked the Barangi border post 42 .

Although the assumptions about "declaring war on us by two border states-Persia and Afghanistan with the unconditional support of England" 43 in the summer of 1930. The assessment of the role of the insurgents based in Afghanistan was correct: "Simultaneously with the complications on the external border... the possibility of a Basmach movement supported from abroad is not excluded." The Soviet leadership decided to launch a preemptive strike on the Basmachi bases in Afghanistan, hoping that the government of Nadir Shah would turn a blind eye to the violation of the country's sovereignty, since ultimately it was interested in weakening Ibrahim beg and those who supported him. As follows from the report submitted on June 26, 1930 to the commander of the SAVO forces P. E. Dybenko, on June 20, parts of the Red Army brigade, concentrated in the area of the village of Ayvaj on the border with Afghanistan, crossed the Amu Darya and, after a multi - kilometer march, attacked Aliabad, the main base of Ibrahim Bek, on the move. However, he and his closest aide, Uthan bek, managed to elude their pursuers and escape into the mountains. But the bases of his formations were destroyed by harsh methods. As noted in the report, "a total of 839 Basmachi and their active accomplices were killed," and among those killed were a number of well-known Basmachi leaders. In addition, "homes were destroyed and the economic base of Basmachestvo was undermined - crops were burned in villages inhabited by emigrants who supplied the" rebels "with food and fodder..., 200 camels, 80 horses, 400 sheep were captured" 44 On the night of June 25-26, 1930, units of the combined brigade of the Red Army were withdrawn to the territory of the USSR.

Analyzing the results of the operation. The Permanent Mission of the OGPU in Central Asia noted that it "dispelled the aura of invincibility of Ibrahim Bek, showed the futility of fighting the Soviets and caused a split in the ranks of emigration" 45 This assessment was clearly exaggerated, but something else was true - the actions of the Soviet side did not entail political complications with the government of Afghanistan, which "perfectly took into account" that the operation "was directed exclusively against Ibrahim Bey, and therefore an order was issued to prevent clashes between our units and the Afghan ones and even [ordered] to conduct an appropriate operation." explanatory work". In general, the Soviet action had a "beneficial" effect "on the position of the Afghan government in relation to emigrants", since Nadir Shah and his entourage came to the conclusion that it was unacceptable to further assist them in any form.

The June expedition of the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan undoubtedly dealt a severe blow to the insurgent forces, but it could not completely paralyze their activity. Ibrahim Beg did not abandon his intentions to take revenge for the defeat, which was somewhat facilitated by the weakening of the government's position in Kabul.

Interesting observations on the development of the situation can be found in the report of Lieutenant Colonel Kowalewski, the Polish military attache in Moscow, dated February 19, 1931. 46 "From source # 9 (agent. - V. G. ) I received the following event information... in Afghanistan... Since the end of January... Nadir Khan's influence was significantly reduced... The point that does not play to Nadir Khan's advantage is his connection with

page 67

the British. The increasing unpopularity of the Kabul government led to a mutiny in Kuhistan, in the north, with the participation of Basmachi who had emigrated from the USSR. The rebellious tribes have taken Fayzabad and are moving west. Ibrahim Beg is preparing for a new adventure in Tajikistan, considering that his relations with the Afghan government, on the one hand, and his position on the Soviet side, on the other, make this highly desirable."

This was confirmed by a report prepared at the headquarters of the Central Asian Military District in the first half of 1931. It noted that "since the summer of 1930, the Afghan government has begun to eliminate the armed emigration force... and entered into a fight with Ibrahim-bek. For six months, eluding the attacks of the Afghan troops, Ibrahim beg moved with his detachment along our border." Through his agents, he was informed about the "clearly unfavorable mood of the Tajik dekhanstvo" in relation to the Soviet government. Soviet analysts attributed this situation to the agitation of tribal elders, Muslim clergy, amnestied members of Basma gangs, and "gross miscalculations and perversions in the practice of building a new life" during collectivization 47

In the late spring of 1931, Ibrahim Beg took the last desperate step in his turbulent life. He crossed to the Soviet side, where there were already skirmishes with the Basmachi. But the Soviet command was ready to deliver a decisive blow. The group, which on April 10 was assigned the task of immediately clearing the cotton-growing areas and large food storage sites from the gangs, and occupying the villages that were formerly the bases of Ibrahim Bey, was already formed. Its head, the deputy commander of the SAVO, I. K. Gryaznov, was ordered to completely destroy the gangs operating in Tajikistan, west of the Kafirnigan River, and prevent their withdrawal to Afghanistan. 48 According to estimates of the SAVO headquarters, Ibrahim Bek, whose main force of 1200-1500 fighters had already broken through to Soviet territory on April 2, 1931, had only about 2000 people at his disposal. Gryaznov could oppose them with 1,618 bayonets, 1,823 sabers, more than 200 machine guns, 12 artillery pieces, 12 aircraft 49 In addition, parts of the OPTU troops and a significant number of employees of the territorial security agencies were involved in the operation. An important role was also played by volunteer detachments of local residents who were opposed to the Basmachi. In June 1931, it became clear that Ibrahim Bek's invasion of Tajikistan had failed. 1,550 rebels were killed and 1,750 surrendered. By June 29, 77 Kurbashi were captured 50 . By this time, according to Soviet military intelligence, only 40 rebels remained at large. 51 . On 20 June, Ibrahim Beg was captured while attempting to cross to the left bank of the Kafirnigan River 52 He was sent to Tashkent, where a short preliminary investigation began, after which he was put on trial, the verdict of which - execution - was predetermined. The case of Ibrahim Bey was given serious importance in Moscow. This is evidenced by the fact that one of the points of the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of June 30, 1931, which read:: "Allow the publication of Ibragim Bek's detention first in the Turkestan press, and then in Moscow" 53

Ibrahim Bey's attempt to rekindle the flames of guerrilla warfare in Tajikistan was the last major armed action of the Soviet-backed opposition sheltering in Afghanistan. In the future, the USSR's relations with its southern neighbor were quite good-neighborly for many years.

page 68

notes

1 Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (hereinafter-RGASPI). F. 62. Op. d. 29. L. 215.

2 Or residents. f. 122. Op. 1. d. 268. L. 151.

3 Or residents. L. 77.

4 Or residents. l. 77-28.

5 Or residents. l. 148-152.

6 Or residents. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 240. L. 16.

7 Or residents.

8 Or residents. f. 5. Op. 1. d. 2129. L. 2-3.

9 Or residents. f. 17. Op. 3. d. 258. L. 4.

10 Or residents. Op. 84. d. 240. L. 16.

11 Or residents. f. 62. Op. 2. d. 26. L. 50-51.

12 Or residents. l. 107.

13 Or residents. d. 23. l. 117.

14 Or residents.

15 Or residents. d. 29. l. 33.

16 Or residents. d. 26. l. 33.

17 Or residents. d. 28. l. 10-11.

18 Or residents. f. 17. Op. 3. D. 343. L. 1.

19 Or residents. f. 62. On. 2. D. 519. l. 1, 2, 16.

20 Or residents. d. 241. l. 13-14.

21 Or residents. d. 519. l. 215.

22 For the resolution, see: or residents. f. 17. Op. 162. d. 1.

23 Or residents.

24 Or residents. d. 5.

25 Ibid. f. 62. Op. 2. d. 194. L. 8-9.

26 Ibid., d. 519. l. 18.

27 Ibid., l. 213.

28 Ibid., l. 1, 12, 16.

29 Ibid., l. 215.

30 Protocol No. 53 (Special) / / RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 7.

31 In 1937, Bacha-i-Sakao's autobiography was published in London, but the accuracy of the information contained in it is very doubtful.

32 RGASPI. f. 62. Op. 2. D. 1806. L. 178.

33 Ibid., l. 88.

34 Ibid., d. 1803. l. 73.

35 Там же. Л. 73.

36 Центральный государственный военный архив (далее - РГВА). Ф. 25895. Oп. 1. Д. 696. Л. 28.

37 РГАСПИ. Ф. 62. Oп. 2. Д. 1806. Л. 52.

38 Там же. Д. 1805. Л. 182.

39 РГВА. Ф. 25895. On. 1. Д. 696. Л. 28.

40 Там же. Л. 602.

41 РГАСПИ. Ф. 62. Oп. 2. Д. 2208. Л. 101.

42 Там же. Л. 88.

43 РГВА. Ф. 25895. Oп. 1. Д. 713. Л. 8.

44 Там же. Д. 176. Л. 614.

45 РГАСПИ. Ф. 62. Oп. 2. Д. 2208. Л. 126.

46 РГВА. Ф. 308. Oп. 6. Д. 38. Л. 11.

47 Or residents. F. 25895. Op. 1. D. 718. L. 2.

48 Там же. Д. 721. Л. 133.

49 Там же.

50 Там же. Л. 147.

51 Там же. Д. 718. Л. 2.

52 Там же.

53 РГАСПИ. Ф. 17. Oп. 162. Д. 10.

Permanent link to this publication: