In 1959 , a book by V. Bill 1 was published, which marked the beginning of the study of the Russian capitalist class by American bourgeois historiography. Bill's work was not considered an achievement in Western Russian studies .2 However, her work was followed by other works of bourgeois historians on the same topic. In the 1960s and early 1980s , a number of dissertations were defended in the United States and England on the history of the formation of the bourgeois class in Russia3.Monographs and journal articles were devoted to various issues of this problem. Such attention is connected with the change in the traditional forms of interpretation of the historical past of our country by bourgeois authors, the desire to overcome the prolonged crisis of bourgeois historiography, to find new methods, to expand the subject and problems of research. There has been a departure of many American and English historians from the traditional predominant study of the ideological and political history of Russia.

The growing interest in the Russian bourgeoisie is also connected with the general increase in the attention of bourgeois historiography to the history of entrepreneurship in general. Historians and economists, based on the concepts of such pillars of bourgeois economic thought as I. Schumpeter and W. Rostow, try to present the bourgeois entrepreneur as the most important driving force of social development. 4 The interest in studying the Russian bourgeoisie is enhanced by the fact that it failed to fulfill the historical mission attributed to business by bourgeois historiography, and turned out to be the first detachment of world capital thrown overboard by history. Trying to understand the reasons for this phenomenon, a number of modern bourgeois historians consider the weakness of this class to be one of the main reasons for the victory of October and October Revolution.-

1 Bill V. T. The Forgotten Class. The Russian Bourgeoisie from the Earliest Beginnings to 1900. N. Y. 1959.

2 The authors of the collective work "Introduction to Russian History" published in Cambridge in 1976 believe that the history of the Russian bourgeoisie was written by V. Bill unsatisfactorily (An Introduction to Russian History. Ed. by R. Anty and D. Obolensky. Cambridge, 1976, p. 265). Cf.: Rabinovich G. H. Krupnaya bourgeoisie i monopolisticheskiy kapital v ekonomiki Sibiri kontsa XIX - nachala XX v. Krupnaya bourgeoisie i monopolisticheskiy kapital v ekonomiki Sibiri kontsa XIX-nachala XX v. [Large Bourgeoisie and Monopolistic Capital in the Siberian Economy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries]. Tomsk. 1975, p. 3.

3 Dossick J. Doctoral Research on Russia and the Soviet Union, 1960 - 1975. N. Y.- Lnd. 1976, pp. 56, 58, 62, 65, 66, 68, 72.

4 For more information, see: Fursenko A. A. Business history in the service of American monopolies. - Questions of history, 1963, N 10; barg M. A. Problems of the Genesis of capitalism in modern bourgeois historiography (the main directions and trends of research). In: Teoreticheskie i istoriograficheskie problemy genezisa kapitalizma [Theoretical and Historiographical problems of the Genesis of Capitalism], Moscow, 1965.

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Russia's path away from the" Western path " of development. This version is supported by W. Chamberlin, S. Harkave, J. Miller, A. Rieber, S. Baron, and a number of others .5 The thesis about the weakness and inconsistency of the bourgeoisie's abilities with the tasks of state administration after the overthrow of tsarism is one of the components of the concept widespread in Sovietism, according to which a "power vacuum" was formed after the fall of tsarism, which the Bolsheviks took advantage of .6
The political history of the Russian bourgeoisie has already been examined in American and English historiography. The concepts of the activities of bourgeois parties and the Provisional Government in Russia that have developed in American and English literature are analyzed in the works of N. G. Dumova, Yu. I. Igritsky, G. Z. Ioffe, G. L. Sobolev, P. N. Zyryanov, V. V. Shelokhaev and other historians .7 The current state of the study of the economic appearance of the Russian capitalist class in the historiography of the United States and England is less illuminated .8 Meanwhile, the attention paid by modern bourgeois historians to this question is very significant. At the same time, many works are devoted to the history of the bourgeoisie in the period of imperialism, on the eve of October 9 .

This article attempts to analyze the views of modern American and English bourgeois historians on a number of issues in the economic history of the Russian bourgeoisie during the imperialist period: the correlation between the role of the state and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist industrialization of Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the national and regional heterogeneity of the bourgeoisie, and the relationship between Russian capitalists and foreign entrepreneurs.

The work of modern Anglo-American historians is significantly influenced by the traditional theories of "Russian exclusivity", "Westernization", and the opposition to "Russian identity".-

5 Harcave S. Russia. A History. 3 rd ed. Chicago. 1956, pp. 456 - 457; Baron S. H. The Weber Thesis and Failure of Capitalist Development in "Early Modern" Russia. - Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, 1970, Bd. 18, Hf. 3, S. 323; Rieber A. The Moscow Entrepreneurial Group: The Emergence of a New Form in Autocratic Politics. - Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, 1977, Bd. 25, Hf. 2, S. 197.

6 For the concept of the "power vacuum", see: Olegin I. N. From February to October (Facts of History and their interpretation in Anglo-American Bourgeois Historiography). - History of the USSR, 1969, N 6.

7 Dumova N. G. Modern Anglo-American historiography on the collapse of the Cadet Party in 1917. - Istoriya SSSR, 1969, N 4; ee same. The history of bourgeois parties in Russia in foreign historiography. - Ibid., 1977, N 6; Ioffe G. Z. The February Revolution of 1917 in Anglo-American bourgeois historiography. Moscow 1970, pp. 113-134; Igritsky Yu. I. Myths of bourgeois historiography and the reality of history. Modern Anglo-American Historiography of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Moscow, 1974, pp. 114-125; Zyryanov P. N., Shelokhaev V. V. The First Russian Revolution in American and English Bourgeois Historiography, Moscow, 1976, pp. 124-154; Marushkin B., Ioffe G., Romanovsky N. Three Revolutions in Russia and Bourgeois Historiography Moscow, 1977, pp. 54-58, 123-128; Sobolev G. L. The October Revolution in American Historiography. 1917-1970-ies. L. 1979, pp. 214-216; Critique of the main concepts of modern bourgeois historiography of three Russian revolutions, Moscow, 1983, pp. 63-72, 122-133.

8 Soviet literature contains only isolated statements of some bourgeois authors on this issue (see: Zyryanov P. N. The Third June Monarchy in Modern American Historiography. Istoriya SSSR, 1970, No. 5; Krupina T. D. Teoriya "modernizatsii" i nekotorye problemy razvitiya Rossii kontsa XIX - nachala XX v. The theory of "Modernization" and some Problems of Russia's Development in the late XIX - early XX centuries. - Ibid., No. 2; Gindin I. F. The concept of capitalist industrialization of Russia in the works of Theodor von Laue. - Ibid., No. 4; Potki na I. V. Russia of the age of capitalism on the pages of the Cambridge Economic History of Europe. - Ibid., 1981, N 4.

9 For the sources of special attention of bourgeois historiography to the history of Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, see: Solov'ev Yu. B. Bourgeois historiography on the direction of Russia's development in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In: Critique of the newest Bourgeois Historiography, L. 1976.

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siya-Zapad" , etc., adapted to the political situation. From the point of view of authors who profess the theory of "Russian exclusivity", Russia missed the chance to create a bourgeoisie in the XVI-XVIII centuries. due to the special, "patrimonial" nature of state power, which restrained and regulated private entrepreneurship, and it was impossible to catch up .10 At the same time, in the 70s and early 80s, the bourgeois literature significantly increased the influence of the theory of "modernization" (renewal), which is opposed to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of socio - economic formations and the revolutionary struggle of the working masses as the main driving force of social development. "Renewal" is understood in this case as a process of transition from an old, traditional society to a new, industrial one, led by a leader acting under the influence of modernizing ideas. In the works of historians of this direction (X. Seaton-Watson, D. Tredgold, S. Black, T. Laue, N. Ryazanovsky, etc.) as the arbiter of "renewal" of Russia is considered an autocratic state, and the Russian" model "of modernization is characterized as"autocratic". According to bourgeois authors, tsarism played the role of the main lever of "renewal", replacing the bourgeoisie, which was absent in Russia at the time of the beginning of this process. The fact that the autocratic state played a role similar to the role of the bourgeoisie in Western European countries, writes, in particular, one of the founders of the theory of "modernization" S. Black 11 .

In the works of bourgeois authors dealing with the socio-economic history of Russia in the late XIX-early XX centuries, the theory of "stages of economic backwardness" by A. Gershenkron is also reflected. At the same time, one of the fundamental points here is the denial of the prerequisites for industrialization and the idea of autocracy as the main lever of the first stage of industrialization of Russia (1885-1905). Only with the transition to industrialization, according to Gershenkron, there were opportunities for the accumulation of capital and the formation of a class of Russian capitalists. As a result, in the second phase of industrialization (1906-1917), the role of autocracy largely passed to the banks, which meant, according to Gershenkron, an approach to Western forms of industrialization (the example is England, where the initiative of individual capitalists is recognized as the driving force of industrialization). The onset of the third phase of industrialization was prevented, as he believes, by the October Revolution (the leading role in this phase should have belonged to the Russian bourgeoisie) .12 T. Laue takes a similar position. The state, in his opinion, acting through a system of patronage, railway construction and external loans, was a decisive factor in the industrialization of Russia.

However, Laue disagrees with Gershenkron in his assessment of the prospects for the development of the Russian bourgeoisie. If Gershenkron assigns it a decisive role in the third (not completed) stage of capitalist industrialization of Russia, then Laue believes that the government's policy did not lead to the growth of private initiative, but rather to its restriction. "The Witte system," he argues, being "a gigantic bet on the Russian capitalists," has directed entrepreneurs "along a path that is alien to them, dictated by the Russian capitalists."-

10 See for more details: Romanovsky N. V. Richard Pipes-professional anti-Soviet. - Voprosy istorii, 1982, N 3; Igritskiy Yu. I. Sovremennaya bourgeois historiography of the problem "Russia-West". - Ibid., 1984, N 1.

11 Black C. E. No Political Alternative to Autocracy had Adequate Support. In: Imperial Russia after 1861. Peaceful Modernization or Revolution? Boston. 1965, pp. 94 - 95.

12 Gerschenkron A. Industrial Progress was Improving the Economic System. - Ibid., pp. 75 - 85.

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not for profit reasons, but for state considerations. " 13 The difference in the assessment of the prospects for the development of the Russian bourgeoisie is connected with the discrepancy between Gershenkron and Laue in explaining the causes of the October Revolution. If October seems to Gershenkron to be a pure accident born of the First World War, then for Laue it is a definite necessity arising from the contradictions of a backward country that has set out to catch up with the advanced countries and has therefore embarked on the path of forced industrialization.

N. Ryazanovsky, J. Beiter, J. Gray, A. Milward, S. Saul and other authors who are optimistic about the possibilities of peaceful renewal of pre-revolutionary Russia interpret the socio - economic history of Russia in the late XIX-early XX centuries according to Gershenkron, believing that only the First World War prevented the successful course of its modernization. Assigning the main role in the economic development of Russia to the tsarist autocracy, the " optimists "(this name is assigned in the literature to representatives of this branch of bourgeois historiography) also note the success of the class formation of the Russian bourgeoisie. 14 In particular, the author of the latest study on the history of the Russian bourgeoisie, American historian T. Owen, writes about the emergence of a real bourgeoisie that recognizes itself as a class in Russia after the revolution of 1905 - 190715 . Unlike the " optimists "who emphasize the progress of tsarist Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, the" pessimists " exaggerate its backwardness and the relative weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie (compared to Western Europe).

Noting the differences between these two versions, however, it is necessary to take into account that both of them (although to varying degrees) tend to distort the role of the autocracy and the Russian bourgeoisie in industrialization, due to the influence of the theories of Gershenkron and Laue, who agree in assessing the role of the state in the industrialization of Russia .16 At the same time, the latest concrete historical studies of the economic policy of tsarism and capitalist entrepreneurship in Russia suggest a departure from the interpretation of autocracy as the main lever of economic development. J. McKay, for example, believes that Gershenkron exaggerates the role that the state played in the Russian economy at the end of the XIX-beginning of the XX century, because "almost all Russian industry remained in private hands" and developed "in a relatively free market system" 17. A. Kagan reproaches Laue for overestimating government spending on the development of the Russian economy 18 . P. Gregory also believes that direct budget financing of the economy (Gershenkron and Laue attach the main importance to it) did not play a decisive role. In his opinion, a truly unique feature of Russian industrialization was the decisive role of the state "in achieving a high rate of capital formation."-

13 Laue Th. von. Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia. N. Y. 1963, pp. 300 - 301.

14 Bater J. H. St. Petersburg: Industrialization and Change. Lnd. 1976, pp. 219 - 390; Milward A. S., Saul S. B. The Development of the Economics of Continental Europe, 1850 - 1914. Lnd. 1977, pp. 383 - 391; Riasanovsky N. V. A History of Russia. 3 rd ed. N. Y. 1977, pp. 449, 470 - 476; Szeftel M. Two Negative Appraisals of Russian Pre-Revolutionary Development. - Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 1980, vol. 14, N 1, p. 81.

15 Owen T. C. Capitalism and Politics in Russia: A Social History of the Moscow Merchants, 1855 - 1905. Cambridge. 1981, p. 205.

16 For the influence of the theoretical schemes of Gershenkron and Laue on concrete historical studies of bourgeois historians, see: Krupina T. D. Uk. soch.

17 McKay J. P. Pioneers for Profit. Foreign Entrepreneurship and Russian Industrialization, 1885 - 1913. Chicago - Lnd. 1970, p. 8.

18 См. Falkus M. E. The Industrialization of Russia, 1700 - 1914. Lnd. 1972, pp. 73 - 74.

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fishing on the basis of domestic and foreign savings " 19 . W. Blackwell writes about the primacy of private initiative and capital in the industrialization of Russia 20 .

A. Gershenkron, T. Laue, P. Gregory, J. Walkin, S. Harkave, S. Wood, G. Stephenson and other English and American historians believe that the decisive role of the state was absolutely necessary due to the backwardness of Russia, the underdevelopment of its entrepreneurial elements, and the lack of domestic private capital capable of industrializing the country. 21 In their opposition, A. Kagan and H. Barkai point out the high "social cost" of capitalist industrialization in Russia and believe that if the cause of industrialization were given entirely to the bourgeoisie, private initiative would achieve the same results, but with lower "social costs". Thus, these authors, unlike Gershenkron and Laue, assume a higher degree of development of the Russian bourgeoisie by the beginning of the industrialization process (the end of the XIX century), as well as the presence of significant private capital in Russia .22 Barkai and Kagan thus approach the idea that autocratic power was by no means a necessary condition for the capitalist inustrialization of Russia (as Gershenkron and others try to present it). It was the autocratic-bureaucratic regime that was largely responsible for the fact that so much private capital in Russia was spent unproductively or was in a position of inactive activity."latent " power. And private wealth in Russia was truly colossal. At the same time, capital accumulation accounted for most of the total increase in the national wealth (in 1913 - 58.5% of the increase).23
Proponents of the concept of the decisive role of the state, as a rule, leave aside the negative aspects of the economic policy of the autocracy, which destroyed with one hand what it built with the other, because it ultimately perceived the forces of capitalism as hostile. Archaic joint-stock legislation hindered the development of entrepreneurship, and the revision of the bill of exchange charter was also delayed for a long time. The government's protectionist policy was reactionary in nature. V. I. Lenin wrote that "in Russia, the reactionary nature of protectionism is particularly pronounced, which retards the country's economic development and serves the interests not of the entire bourgeois class ,but only of a handful of ace oligarchs." 24 The transition to a gold currency (one of Witte's most important measures) also affected the country's economic development, limiting demand. The policy of attracting foreign capital also had negative consequences 25 .

19 Gregory P. R. 1913 Russian National Income: Some Insights into Russian Economic Development. - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1976, vol. 90. N 3, pp. 456 - 457.

20 Blackwell W. L. The Historical Geography of Industry in Russia during the Nineteenth Century. In: Studies in Russian Historical Geography. Vol. 2. Lnd. 1983, p. 387; см. также: Cambridge Economic History of Europe. Vol. VII. pt. 2. Cambridge. 1978, p. 275; Johnson R. E. Peasant and Proletarian. The Working Class of Moscow in the Late Nineteenth Century. New Brunswick. 1979, pp. 21 - 22.

21 Maynard J. Russia in Flux before October. N. Y. 1962, p. 96; Wood S. H. Russia in the Early Twentieth Century (1904 - 1924). Bath. 1965, pp. 13 - 14; Laue Th. von. Problems of Industrialization. In: Russia under the Last Tsar. Minneapolis. 1969, pp. 130 - 131; Gregory P. R. Russian Industrialization and Economic Growth. Results and Perspectives of Western Research. - Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, 1977, Bd. 25, Hf. 2, S. 211 - 213.

22 См. Gregory P. R. Russian Industrialization and Economic Growth, pp. 211 - 213.

23 Weinstein A. L. National wealth and economic accumulation of pre-revolutionary Russia. Statistical research, Moscow, 1960, p. 421.

24 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 1, pp. 457-458.

25 Sidorov A. L. Financial position of Russia during the First World War, Moscow, 1960, p. 19; Bovykin V. I. K voprosu o roli inostrannogo kapitala v Rossii [On the issue of the role of foreign capital in Russia]. - Bulletin of Moscow State University, history series, 1964, N 1.

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Bourgeois historians usually misinterpret the question of state - monopoly capitalism in pre-revolutionary Russia. The processes of state regulation of the economy, the interaction of organizations of the monopolistic bourgeoisie and the organs of the tsarist government are often considered by them as a manifestation of the traditional state management of the country's economic development since the time of Peter the Great. R. Ruza, the author of a number of works on the Council of Congresses of Representatives of Industry and Trade, believes that only the "limited historical vision" of Russian capitalists can explain the fact that they attributed the origins of this phenomenon to the period of the Witte ministry, and not to the reign of Peter i26 . Modern bourgeois historians such as N. Ryazanovsky, J. Kip, and E. Crankshaw do not see a fundamental difference between state - monopolistic regulation of the Russian economy at the beginning of the XX century and state intervention in the XVIII-XIX centuries. 27
Bourgeois researchers do not separate the old forms of state regulation of the economy, which were manifested in the pre - capitalist period, from the new state-capitalist forms that emerged in the era of capitalism. They also do not take into account the fact that along with the type of state capitalism, in the functioning of which the tsarist government played the main role, a new type of relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie was formed with the beginning of the First World War, which, unlike the first, arose on the basis of the established monopoly capitalism. This type of relationship was characterized by a more active role of monopolistic capital .28
The distortion of the social image of the Russian bourgeoisie also occurs as a result of the identification of its economic and political faces. Many bourgeois authors write about the" weakness " of the Russian bourgeoisie, without pointing out the fact that the degree of economic development of the bourgeoisie in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries clearly did not correspond to the role it played in the country's political life .29 Despite the evolution of the autocracy towards a bourgeois monarchy, the nobility still remained the politically dominant class. But at the beginning of the twentieth century, the bourgeoisie was " the most economically powerful class in capitalist Russia,"30 because "the bourgeoisie is really a class force that, under capitalism, inevitably dominates both the monarchy and the most democratic republic in the world."31 And although the Russian bourgeoisie was less developed than the bourgeoisie of the advanced capitalist countries, in economic terms

26 Roosa R. Russian Industrialists and "State Socialism", 1906 - 1917. - Soviet Studies, 1972, vol. 23, N 3, p. 397.

27 Riasanovsky N. "Oriental Despotism" in Russia. In: The Development of the USSR. An Exchange of Views. Seattle. 1964, p. 342; Crankshaw E. The Shadow of the Winter Palace: Drift to Revolution, 1825 - 1917. Lnd. - Basingstoke. 1976, p. 390; An Introduction to Russian History. Cambridge. 1976, p. 217.

28 See: Uribes E. The Russian coke and gasoline industry during the First World War. In: Historical Notes. 1961. T. 69; Korelin A. P. Monopolies in the steam locomotive and wagon building industry of Russia. In: Voprosy istorii kapitalisticheskoi Rossii [Questions of the History of Capitalist Russia]. The multi-layout problem. Sverdlovsk. 1972; Aliyarov S. S. From the history of state-monopoly capitalism in Russia: A special meeting on fuel and oil monopolies. Istoriya SSSR, 1977, N 6; Laverychev V. Ya. Gosudarstvo i monopolii v dorevolyutsionnoi Rossii [State and Monopolies in Pre-revolutionary Russia], Moscow, 1982.

29 Fainsod M. How Russia is Ruled. Cambridge (Mass.). 1967, pp. 25 - 27; Goldston R. The Russian Revolution. Lnd. 1967, pp. 58, 167; Kochan L. Russia in Revolution. 1890 - 1918. Lnd. 1978, pp. 66 - 67.

30 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 23, p. 395.

31 Ibid., vol. 43, p. 238.

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its face, as in more developed countries, was defined by joint-stock enterprises, "the most advanced industrial and financial capitalism" 32, which already in 1906 accounted for about 70% of the profits of all enterprises with an income of more than 50 thousand rubles per year33 .

Some bourgeois researchers also point out the fact of the discrepancy between the political and economic appearance of the Russian bourgeoisie. 34 However, the only noteworthy attempt to determine the specific economic shape of the Russian bourgeoisie at the beginning of the 20th century was made by the American historian D. Brower. He criticized the idea of the absence of the bourgeoisie in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. Based on a survey of 57 provincial cities (for 1913), extracted from the fund of the Main Directorate for Local Economy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Brouwer came to the conclusion that small entrepreneurs in the Russian provincial bourgeoisie have a huge numerical predominance over large and medium capitalists. He also notes the presence of a small stratum of large capitalists ("urban aristocrats") .35 Brouwer's limited analysis of the social structure of provincial cities is not sufficient to draw general conclusions about the economic appearance of the Russian capitalist class, since it does not take into account a significant part of the big bourgeoisie, which is mainly concentrated in the capital cities. Nevertheless, Brouwer's research is interesting, because the works of other American and English historians lack a concrete analysis of the class structure of the Russian bourgeoisie during the period of imperialism.

Some of these authors focus on highlighting the weaknesses and backwardness of Russian monopolistic capital. Thus, O. Crisp asserts that the high concentration of production and capital in Russian industry was not evidence of a high level of its development, but rather "a manifestation of insufficiently developed capitalism" 36 . Indeed, the process of concentration of production and centralization of capital in Russia at the beginning of the XX century. it bore some features of economic and political backwardness. The attempts of bourgeois historians to give these features an exclusive, defining significance are clearly untenable. The high level of concentration of production in Russian industry at the beginning of the twentieth century was primarily the result of Russia's entry into the stage of imperialism, which is characterized by the socialization of production. Studies by Soviet historians show that there was no fundamental difference between Russian imperialism and the imperialism of highly developed capitalist countries .37 Pre-imperialist traits were more or less common only to certain separate groups of the Russian bourgeoisie .38 Already in the 80s and 90s

32 Ibid., vol. 16, p. 417.

33 Dyakin V. S. Autocracy, bourgeoisie and nobility in 1907-1911, Moscow, 1978, p. 6.

34 Напр., Clarkson J. D. A History of Russia. N. Y. 1961, p. 375.

35 Brower D. R. Urban Russia on the Eve of World War One: a Social Profile. - Journal of Social History, 1980, vol. 13, N 3, pp. 424 - 435. A similar conclusion in Soviet historiography was made even earlier as a result of the analysis of statistics on the payment of the fishing tax for 1912. (Gindin I. F. Russian bourgeoisie in the period of capitalism, its development and features. - History of the USSR, 1963, N 3, p. 38).

36 Crisp O. Studies in the Russian Economy before 1914. Lnd. 1976, p. 41.

37 See: Sidorov A. L. V. I. Lenin on Russian military-feudal imperialism (on the content of the term "military-feudal imperialism"). In: On the Peculiarities of imperialism in Russia, Moscow, 1963; Tarnovsky K. N. Sovetskaya istoriografiya rossiiskogo imperializma, Moscow, 1964.

38 See: Gindin I. F., Ivanov L. M. On the uneven development of Russian capitalism at the beginning of the XX century. - Questions of history, 1965, N 9; Gindin, I. F., some features of the economic and social structure of Russian capitalism in the early twentieth century. - Istoriya SSSR, 1966, N 3; Rabinovich G. Kh. Uk. soch.

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In the 19th century, the first monopolistic associations such as cartels and syndicates appeared in Russia .39 At the beginning of the twentieth century, along with these forms of monopolies, the highest types of monopolistic associations, such as concerns and trusts, also developed .40 Joint-stock companies and stock exchange gambling are becoming the most important forms of activity of Russian capital 41 .

Bourgeois historians also misinterpret the question of the national and regional heterogeneity of the Russian bourgeoisie. The fact that the Russian bourgeoisie, perhaps like no other group of world capital, was heterogeneous, serves some of them as evidence of the absence of the bourgeoisie as a formal social whole in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. The American historian M. Raev believes, for example ,that in Russia at the beginning of the XX century there were only "groups of merchants and industrialists" 42. Capitalists in Russia on the eve of 1917 "hardly constituted a class," says the English journalist and historian D. Brown .43 The contradictions that existed between various regional and branch groupings of Russian capitalists are interpreted by the English historian J. R. R. Tolkien. White as the main factor preventing the formation of a unified All-Russian organization of the bourgeoisie. It was precisely the contradictions between the Moscow and St. Petersburg capitalists that, in White's opinion, prevented the Council of Congresses of Representatives of Industry and Trade from representing the interests of all Russian capital. The Council of Congresses, in his opinion, reflected the interests of only the "Petersburg section" of the Russian bourgeoisie .44
More realistic is the point of view of R. Ruza, who believes that the work of the Congress Council was also attended by the heads of enterprises that owned establishments in various parts of the empire; they considered the capital only as their conveniently located headquarters. In her opinion, the thesis that the Council of Congresses is an organization only of the St. Petersburg bourgeoisie is contradicted by the fact that the magazine Promyshlennost I Torgovle covered many issues of social and economic life that contradicted the position of the St. Petersburg capitalists. The struggle that took place within the Council of Congresses between various groups shows that not only St. Petersburg entrepreneurs, but also capitalists in other regions took this organization into account and sought to defend their interests in it .45
One of the reasons for the economic weakness of the bourgeoisie in Russia, bourgeois historians see in the fact that a significant part of it was made up of people of Jewish nationality, who, due to their belittled political position and persecution by the tsarist authorities

39 Bovykin V. I. Origin of financial capital in Russia, Moscow, 1967.

40 Krupina, Etc. To the question about the features of monopolization of the industry in Russia. In: On the peculiarities of imperialism in Russia; Laverychev V. Ya. Monopolistic capital in the textile industry of Russia (1900-1917). Moscow, 1963; Aliyarov S. S. Oil monopolies in Azerbaijan during the First World War. Baku. 1974; Dyakonova I. A. Nobel Corporation in Russia, Moscow, 1980.

41 Shepelev L. E. Joint stock Companies in Russia, L. 1973; Bokhanov A. N. Birzhevaya pressa Rossii [Exchange Press of Russia]. - Istoriya SSSR, 1980, N 2; Buranov Yu. A. Aktionirovanie gornozavodskoy promyshlennosti Urala (1861-1917 gg.). Moscow, 1982.

42 Cit. по: Cantor N. Perspectives on the European Past. Conversations with Historians. N. Y. -Lnd. 1971, p. 263.

43 Brown D. Doomsday 1917. The Destruction of Russia's Ruling Class. Lnd 1975, p. 37.

44 White J. Moscow, Petersburg and the Russian Industrialists. In Reply to Ruth Amende Roosa. - Soviet Studies, 1973, vol. 24, N 3. This issue of the journal contains a polemic between White and Ruza on the nature of the Council of Congresses of Representatives of Industry and Trade. At the same time, White relied mainly on the memoirs of P. A. Buryshkin, and Ruza used the materials of the organ of the Council of Congresses of the magazine "Industry and Trade".

45 Roosa R. A. "United" Russian Industry. - Soviet Studies, 1973, vol. 24, N 3, pp. 423 - 425.

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they could not become an "integral part" of the bourgeois class .46 The oppression of the Jewish bourgeoisie is portrayed by bourgeois historians as a factor that significantly limited its entrepreneurial activity. Thus, the authors of the collective monograph "Economic History of the Jews" 47, describing the participation of Jews in various spheres of capitalist entrepreneurship, argue that the success of the Jewish bourgeoisie would be more significant if discrimination did not limit the "benefits of economic progress for Jews"48 . Similar statements are found in the works of other authors .49 At the same time, bourgeois researchers clearly underestimate the degree of cohesion of the bourgeoisie in the structure of Russian society. The facts clearly show that the Tsarist policy on the Jewish question discriminated primarily against the lower classes of the Jewish nation. They were mainly concerned with restrictions on movement and economic activities. The obstacles to the Jewish bourgeois elite were not insurmountable. Restrictions on the place of residence of persons of Jewish nationality who had a higher education or were members of the first merchant guild were abolished in 1856.

Many of the Jewish entrepreneurs converted to the Orthodox faith, and their connection with the Jewish communities abroad, which were run by the largest Western industrialists and bankers, made it easier for them to get credit, which can primarily explain the wide scale of entrepreneurial activity of the Jewish bourgeoisie. Among the largest representatives of the financial oligarchy were Jews M. L. Balabanov (one of the leaders of the metallurgical industry), N. A. Gordon (oil and tobacco king), G. D. Lesin (stockbroker), I. P. Manus (heavy industry), G. I. Rubinstein (Azov-Don Bank), M. A. Soloveitchik (Siberian Trade Bank). bank), Ya. I. Utin (head of the Accounting and Loan Bank), and others. Persons of Jewish nationality accounted for 55% of all Russian merchants of the first and second guilds50 .

Modern American and English historians often cover the problem of relations between the Russian bourgeoisie and foreign entrepreneurs from the same perspective - in search of evidence of the weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie. Many of them see the role of foreign capital in the industrialization of Russia as both evidence and one of the main reasons for the weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie. The Russian capitalist class, in their view, was undeveloped "partly because of the crucial role played by foreign investors in Russia"; the big Russian bourgeoisie are just "agents" of foreign financiers and industrialists who "exploited their own people and the country's natural resources in the interests of foreigners" 51 . In bourgeois historiography one can find statements about the dominant position of foreign capital in Russian industry up to the First World War and its further growth propor-

46 Miller J. Questions on 1917. - Soviet Studies, 1967, vol. 19, N 2, p. 255.

47 The main authors of this work are S. Baron and A. Kagan. Baron, who wrote the 15-volume History of the Jews, is described in the book's editorial introduction as" the most outstanding " of modern Jewish historians.

48 Economic History of the Jews. N. Y. 1976, p. 97.

49 Greenberg A. The Jews in Russia. The Struggle for Emancipation. Vol. 2. New Haven. - Lnd. 1965, pp. 33 - 34; Dijur J. M. Jews in the Russian Economy. In: Russian Jewry (1860 - 1917). N. Y.-Lnd. 1966, p. 142; Baron S. W. The Russian Jew under the Tsars and Soviets. N. Y.-Lnd. 1976, pp. 88 - 94.

50 Vostokov L. Antinarodnaya deyatel'nost ' zionistov v Rossii [Anti-national activity of Zionists in Russia]. Voprosy istorii, 1973, No. 3, p. 23.

51 Wren M. C. The Course of Russian History. N. Y. 1958, p. 546; Carmichael J. A. Short History of the Russian Revolution. Lnd. 1966, p. 139; Goldstein R. Op. cit., p. 58.

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Russian origin and even the thesis of Russia's semi-colonial dependence on Western European states 52 . Thus, F. Carstensen, while denying the existence of a process of Russification of the management apparatus of foreign companies operating in Russia (he "justifies" his denial by the example of only two American corporations - "Zinger" and " International Harvester Co."), argues that this circumstance "may be important for understanding the political weakness of the Russian middle class (i.e., the Russian middle class). the bourgeoisie. - Author ) and the ultimate victory of Bolshevism " 53 .

However, in the publications of the 60s and 70s, the thesis of semi-colonial dependence of Russia is much less common than in the" Soviet studies " works of the previous period. This is due both to the desire of modern bourgeois historians to whitewash the activities of foreign capitalists in Russia, and, perhaps, to the influence of Soviet historiography, which has long outlived the idea of Russia as a semi-colony of Western European states and shows its origin. A number of bourgeois authors (McKay, Clarkson, Mendel, etc.) note a decrease in the share of foreign capital in the total volume of share capital invested in Russian industry in the last pre - revolutionary decade, and an increase in the number of Russian administrative and managerial personnel of foreign monopolies as an indicator of the growth of personnel of the domestic bourgeoisie in Russia. 54
Of particular interest in this regard are the works of J. R. R. Tolkien. McKay, who came to reject the thesis of semi - colonial dependence as a result of a specific historical study of the entrepreneurship of foreigners in Russia, performed by him on the basis of studying a wide range of documentary materials from the archives of a number of major French and Belgian banks. McKay believes that foreign capital did not hinder the development of the Russian bourgeoisie, on the contrary, acting at the first stage as a "substitute" for domestic capital and entrepreneurial initiative in a number of industries, it then caused the growth of domestic entrepreneurship in these industries by its example and creating appropriate conditions .55
The idea that the main thing that Russia needed at the end of the XIX century. to accelerate industrial development, it was not capital, but the ability to do business, he justifies the facts of the widespread use of capital of Russian origin by foreign entrepreneurs. This, according to McKay, is also evidenced by the decrease in active productive foreign investment in 1906-1914 and the increase in passive capital investment. These changes, he believes, were an indicator that Russian capitalists had mastered the technique of entrepreneurship. Russia "now needed only the money of a foreigner, and not his ability to organize a business." Nor were the banks dominated by foreigners: "Russian bankers were energetic and confident people who worked with foreigners as equals." 56
On the whole, however, bourgeois historians tend to idealize the activities of foreign capital in Russia. The same McKay claims that the only concern of foreign capitalists in Russia was the search for greater profits than at home, which they achieved.-

52 Parker W. H. An Historical Geography of Russia. Lnd. 1968, pp. 280, 282.

53 Carstensen F. V. American Multinational Corporations in Imperial Russia: Chapters on Foreign Enterprise and Russian Economic Development. - The Journal of Economic History, 1977, vol. 37, N 1, p. 247.

54 Clarkson J. D. Op. cit., p. 405; Mendel A. P. On Interpreting the Fate of Imperial Russia. In: Russia under the Last Tsar, p. 25; The Modernization of Japan and Russia. A Comparative Study. N. Y.-Lnd. 1973, p. 179.

55 McKay J. P. Op. cit., p. 15.

56 Ibid., pp. 212, 215 - 216, 236 - 237, 240.

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a state of excellence in engineering and technology. It is silent about the political motives of foreign capital and the negative aspects of its influence on the development of the country's productive forces. 57 Crispus, who studies the activities of French capital in Russia, without any justification denies that the French capitalists put pressure on their government in order to encourage it to more actively protect their interests. She categorically denies the existence of political intentions in the activities of foreign capital, saying that the French businessmen pursued "purely financial goals." Where political motives were involved, this was entirely the work of the French Government .58
Nevertheless, the activities of foreign capitalists in Russia were not as harmless as bourgeois authors try to present the case. The competition was not only between foreign and Russian monopolies, between monopolies of different nationalities, but also between foreign capitalists of the same nationality. In this struggle, the capitalists resorted to various means, including pressure on their governments in order to encourage them to more actively protect the economic interests of their subjects in Russia .59 The opinion about the apolitical nature of foreign capital also does not stand up to criticism. Studies by Soviet historians show how often commercial affairs were used to solve political issues .60
Along with its positive impact, foreign capital also had a restraining effect on the development of the country's productive forces (especially in the last pre-revolutionary decade), and the end result of its impact was generally negative .61 The reactionary role of foreign capital in Russia was also manifested in the fact that its influx supported the existence of the autocracy and helped it suppress the revolutionary actions of the masses.

An incorrect assessment of the "non-national" bourgeoisie in Russia also leads to miscalculations in covering the development of the Russian bourgeoisie. This category includes those foreign entrepreneurs who entered the Russian economy in the XIX century, took Russian citizenship, Russified, and conducted their main business on the territory of the empire. At the beginning of the XX century. they were an integral part of the Russian capitalist class. In the works of American and English historians, they often appear as representatives of foreign capital or as cosmopolitan entrepreneurs .62
A critical analysis of the Anglo-American historiography shows that it now preserves the already noted Soviet studies of the history of the Russian Empire.-

57 See Ananyich B. V. Foreign entrepreneurship and industrial development of Russia in the late XIX-early XX centuries (on the book by John McKee). In: Critique of the latest Bourgeois Historiography.

58 Crisp О. Russo-Chinese Bank: An Episode in Franko-Russian Relations. - Slavonic and East European Review, 1974, vol. LII, N 127, p. 211.

59 See, for example, K. F. Shatsillo. Foreign capital and Russian naval programs on the eve of the First World War. In: Historical Notes. 1961. T. 69; Fursenko A. A. The first oil export syndicate in Russia (1893-1897). In: Monopolies and Foreign Capital in Russia.

60 See: Gindin I. F. Commerce and Politics (from the history of Franco-Russian relations in 1912-1913). In: French Yearbook, Moscow, 1963; Ganelin R. S. Tsarism, Bourgeoisie and American Capital before the February Revolution of 1917. In: Historical Notes. 1968. Vol. 81.

61 Bovykin V. I. K voprosu o roli inostrannogo kapitala v Rossii [On the role of foreign capital in Russia], p. 73.

62 Treadgod D. W. Twentieth Century Russia. Chicago. 1959, p. 96; Henderson W. O. The Industrial Revolution on the Continent. Germany, France, Russia, 1800 - 1914. Lnd. 1961, pp. 203, 211 - 212, 215 - 216, 218 - 219; Tolf R. W. The Russian Rockefellers. The Saga of the Nobel Family and the Russian Oil Industry. Stanford. 1976; Milward A. S., Saul S. B. Op. cit., p. 407.

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There are two divergent trends. One of them, guided by the theories of "Russian exclusivity", "modernization", "stages of economic backwardness" and others, portrays the Russian bourgeoisie as an undeveloped, economically weak class, which is combined with an exaggeration of the role of the state and foreign capital in economic development, distorting the national composition, economic and political appearance of Russian capitalists. Some bourgeois authors (T. Laue, D. Brown) generally deny the existence of an established class of the Russian bourgeoisie at the beginning of the XX century. The degree of maturity of Russian capital is more highly appreciated by bourgeois historians, who are optimistic about the possibility of peaceful renewal of Russia within the framework of the capitalist system and consider the progress of capitalist entrepreneurship at the beginning of the XX century. as a sign of "modernization".

Especially noteworthy is the appearance in the latest bourgeois historiography of works whose authors, while remaining generally on the positions of the prevailing theoretical schemes and concepts, at the same time try to revise some of their provisions and, in particular, to amend the ideas about the role of the state and foreign capital, to give a more objective, balanced assessment of the importance of the Russian bourgeoisie. The authors of these works (McKay, Brouwer, Kagan, Blackwell, etc.) came to revise the previously prevailing assessments and opinions on the basis of specific historical studies carried out with the involvement of documentary (including archival) material, familiarization with the works of Soviet historians.

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